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I. INTRODUCTION
Science is not supposed to tout certainty for its findings. It leaves absolute
truth to other fields, such as mathematics, logic, and religion. There are, of
course, well-confirmed theories and "laws" that do warrant the loose use of
"certain." The bare theoretical possibility that the oxidation theory of combustion
will fall and the phlogiston theory will be restored to its rightful place does not
move the research establishment. And scientists (like many others) are certain
that scientific methodology is a powerful tool for illuminating the world, if not
everything about every aspect of existence.
So, within this very stance, scientists themselves should be skeptical of
critiques of what is thought to be already established. Moderate conservatism of
this sort is rational and often inevitable.2 The burden of proof, at the start, is
rightly on the critics of accepted scientific claims unless those claims are absurd
(which is rarely the case). And, for their part, scientists like Semmelweis,
Marshall, and Warren were also right not to take established matters as certain.
Calls for skepticism in the face of scientific claims generally, and
vaccination claims in particular, are, thus, welcome among the rational. Professor
Holland's article (the "Article") calls attention to important medical, scientific,
and constitutional issues, but has flaws requiring attention. Skepticism of medical
or scientific claims may be a rational necessity, but her Article is an uneven and
incomplete expression of that skepticism, for the reasons that follow in this
Response's Parts II-V. The Article relies, at various points, on flawed modes of
inference and questionable sources of opinion and information; it fails to specify
underlying value and policy assumptions; and its analysis of constitutional
precedents and doctrine does not confirm her claims that compulsory vaccination
programs are constitutionally suspect within current or preexisting doctrine.
One should ask what incites Professor Holland's complaints about current
1. See PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 13 (2001) ("To claim the truth of a
statement is not to declare the certainty of our knowledge. Whatever hopes our predecessors may
have had, contemporary views about human knowledge are saturated by the conviction that our
beliefs about nature are fallible, that absolute certainty is not an option for us. When someone
maintains the truth of the thesis about the composition of the atmosphere, he can consistently
acknowledge the possibility that further inquiry might reveal it to be false. Indeed, we spend our
lives proclaiming true, and acting upon, beliefs we recognize as vulnerable to the course of future
experience. There is no snapping shut of our minds, no insulation against critical scrutiny, when we
move from saying what we believe to declaring its truth.").
2. Of course, critics should not have treated Marshall and Warren (bacteria cause many ulcers)
and Semmelweis (germ theory of disease) as badly as they did, but much of the initial skepticism of
received wisdom is sound. See Polyxeni Potter, About the Cover: Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis (1818-
65), 7 EMERGING INFEcTIOUs DISEASES 368 (2001), available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/
7/2/ac-0702_article.htm; Kathryn Schulz, Stress Doesn't Cause Ulcers! Or, How To Win a Nobel
Prize in One Easy Lesson: Barry Marshall on Being... Right, SLATE, Sept. 9, 2010,
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immunization practices and policies-at least as applied to hepatitis B
vaccination, which is the Article's prime target. Here are some possibilities,
starting with the least likely, but nonetheless important:
m It is in pursuit of loyal opposition to science in application-a way of
keeping scientists honest and promoting due care in formulating, confirming, and
disclosing hypotheses and findings. We are all from Missouri, after all. And, no
more than with any other institution, we probably should not rely on science to
police its own domain.
E It is meant to vindicate autonomy and the rule of law, regularly scorned
by overbearing governments and greedy pharmaceutical companies.
m Some think that there have been serious injuries from vaccinations,
including those for hepatitis B; these pressing facts require ventilation and calls
for reducing or terminating some programs.
I doubt that the Article is simply meant to keep science on its toes. It seems
likelier to be a reaction to a sense of autonomy under assault by at least some
vaccination projects, and a push toward deemphasizing them. True enough,
autonomy is always under assault. Give the government or immense private
interests an inch, and they will take a light year. (Sometimes little private
interests do that too.)The Article does not claim there is a pattern (systematic or
otherwise) of putting down individual liberty of certain sorts, but its critique of
supposed conflicts of interest and "financial distortions" suggests a governmental
and commercial indifference to claims against personal intrusions.
As for the view that there are facts showing that the risk of vaccine-related
injury is unacceptable, I do not think that is made out here, although the author is
right to reject arrogant dismissals about such injuries by persons who seem to
know that nothing can go wrong. A central distinction to stress is that between
vaccine-caused injury-whether it occurs and at what rate-and what constitutes
"acceptable losses." Other critical distinctions concern the attribution of injuries
to vaccines. Such distinctions include the differences between (1) associational
links simpliciter and causation and (2) injuries caused by the active components
of the vaccine and those caused by additives (e.g., thimerosal). I do not recall
encountering any calls for halting hepatitis B vaccinations because of the one-in-
1.1 million risk of anaphylactic shock concededly created by the vaccine. 4 The
author does not insist on a zero incidence of vaccine-related injuries (never mind
a zero incidence of adverse events correlated with vaccination), but her tolerance
is not great. Not unexpectedly, her tolerance for "low benefit" is also limited.
3. Missouri is known as the "Show-Me" state. See Missouri History: Why Is Missouri Called
the "Show-Me" State?, Mo. SECRETARY ST. ROBIN CARNAHAN, http://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/
history/slogan.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2011).
4. See, e.g., Eric E. Mast et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, A Comprehensive
Immunization Strategy To Eliminate Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United
States; Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) Part II:
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"According to this information [from the U.S. Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP)], the United States now vaccinates
approximately 4 million infants per year to prevent approximately 525 cases of
likely infection, or about 10,000 infants to prevent likely illness in one child."5
But this description does not constitute an argument for any legal or policy
conclusion and, in this sense, cannot stand alone. Without applying the asserted
facts and factual hypotheses to accepted value premises, this description imports
no value conclusions whatever. In fact, privately, and as a matter of public
policy, we often bear harms that seem, monetarily, to outweigh the benefits.
Moreover, little is said about the seriousness of hepatitis B infections; only the
number 525 is recorded. Still more, the very idea of "prevent[ing] 525 cases of
likely infection" is sought to be trivialized by saying that the benefit is to one in
10,000. (On the figures presented, it's actually about one in 7600.) Something
more is needed to explain the insistent call to arms.
What follows is not a point-by-point account and evaluation of the Article,
and is not meant to be a comprehensive freestanding article either. I am
addressing ideas that are worth further illumination. More specifically, I assess
the Article's analysis of constitutional precedent and doctrine, criticize how it
addresses the evidence of vaccination harm and benefit, and question its very
framework for determining what constitutes harm and benefit on an individual
and social scale. In the course of doing this, I try to probe the value premises
underlying supposed collisions of personal autonomy with social claims and how
these have been, and are likely to be, managed within a constitutional framework.
In short, I try to address conceptual, doctrinal, and empirical flaws in the Article.6
II. THE OLDER CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT-JACOBSON: HANDLE WITH
GREATER CARE
Much of Professor Holland's Article is about constitutional law. The
threshold reason for this is obvious: If there are objections to compulsory
vaccination, basic issues of the integrity of the person are openly contested, and
rights will be invoked against government action. These are constitutional issues,
and, if the constitution is to be obeyed, they are rule of law issues. Another
5. Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B Mandate for
Infants and Young Children, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 39 (2012). For statutory
sources and history, see ACIP Charter: Authority, Objective, and Description, Authority, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/
download/charter.pdf.
6. Because many issues derive from efforts to assess and compare advantages and
disadvantages of vaccination programs, I note, for clarity, that references to "costs" should be
broadly understood to include at least all direct adverse harms and disadvantages from vaccinations
and their programs: the financial burden and physical and mental harms of adverse incidents
attributable to the vaccine or the way in which the program is administered; attenuation of
autonomy norms; even Heckler's Veto problems in objecting, rationally or not, to vaccination.
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reason is that the constitutional matrix is a heuristic that drives us to probe the
idea and practice of vaccination, or, indeed, any policy that finds itself embedded
within a constitutional dispute. The constitutional framework, rightly used,
illuminates the moral and policy issues and draws out analytical strands that
might be overlooked within a looser framework for analysis. Rightly used, it
skews nothing. (I do not address arguments against "over legalization," many of
which are hugely flawed.)7
A third reason, amplifying the first two, is that adjudication involving
technology generally, and vaccination in particular, may provide special
challenges to constitutional interpretation and argumentation.8 In this light, the
constitution and vaccination need each other. The conceptual tools we use in
constitutional theory and adjudication reflect the hierarchy of values embedded in
the constitution; its text is not value free-a point quite independent of
jurisprudential debates about meaning, interpretation, and authority. The rights,
interests, and political structures embedded in the constitution are, to greater or
lesser degree, aspects of American identity (a sprawling, but not meaningless,
idea) and its vaunted exceptional status. What these rights, interests, and
structures mean in theory and operation are tested constantly, but real-world
developments-often technological innovations-push us to unpack and develop
meanings that had been comfortably dormant. Jacobson v. Massachuselts9-that
old, old case-represented a major medical innovation that had been introduced
over a century earlier and pointedly required constitutional explication in a
science-infused controversy.
Technological developments, from Jacobson through Roe v. Wade through
future artificial gestation and cloning cases, require us to rethink our threshold
values and, thus, necessarily how we implement them through tools for sorting
and comparing constitutional claims. These tools are our standards of review.
The competing views about and within science mentioned by Justice Harlan are
with us now with increasing frequency and complexity.'oJacobson itself is, thus,
a continuing presence. In a contemporary compulsory vaccination case applying
today's doctrine, 11the Court will be pressed to be more precise about its
7. See Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of Ethics and Law "Catching
Up" with Technology, 33 IND. L. REv. 17, 87-103 (1999).
8. Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and Standards of Review Under Pressure
from Biological Technologies, I IHEALTH MATRIX: CASE W. RES. J.L. & MED. 351, 486 (2001)
(referring to the goal of "learn[ing] more about constitutional adjudication by watching it when it is
pressed by biomedical technology").
9. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
10. "The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be
wrong, is not conclusive; for the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the
common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases." Jacobson,
197 U.S. at 35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.Y. 97, 99 (1904)).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 50-81, 86-92, where I refer to such a case as Jacobson
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conceptual template than it was in saying, "According to settled principles, the
police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly legislative enactment as will protect the public
health and the public safety." This opaque formulation will not do today,
although it seems as explicit as standards of review were at the time and was
similar to the standard expressed in that exemplar of judicial aggressiveness,
Lochner v. New York, which struck down the state's regulation of the working
hours of bakers. Unless we view both courts and legislatures as black boxes,
something more penetrable than "reasonableness" is required.13
Within Jacobson's standard of review (which I construe as far from fully
deferential to government), how does the Court address conflicting scientific
claims (if at all), their legislative assessment and use, and the legislative
valuations of means and ends? If a single study supports a given finding
(confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis), does the strictest scrutiny entail
deference to the accuracy of the raw data, or to the methodologies for generating
and drawing inferences from them? With strict or other heightened scrutiny, flat
references to the need to defer to the legislature simply do not work, as they do
within minimal scrutiny.14Unlimited deference even to factual conclusions makes
no sense under strict scrutiny, a point rightly mandated by the framework of the
Article. But the idea of lay judges vetting the complexities of scientific claims
does not inspire confidence either. So, there is much more to come beyond
Jacobson.
A. The Claim that Jacobson Has Been Expanded
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
five-dollar fine15 imposed on the defendant for refusing to be vaccinated against
smallpox. The Rev. Jacobson was a Lutheran clergyman who had emigrated from
Sweden, but the exact nature of his objection to vaccination was not made clear
in the opinion. At least one historical commentary suggests he believed that
vaccination was counter to God's preference that we follow nature. The same
source says that he ultimately paid the fine, under threat of confinement. 16The
12. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.
13. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
15. Five dollars was a much bigger deal at the time of Jacobson. The average factory worker
in America in 1905 earned around thirteen dollars per week. MICHAEL WILLRICH, Pox: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 285 (2011).
16. Who Is Reverend Henning Jacobson?, SUBURBAN EMERGENCY MGMT. PROJECT (Oct. 7,
2009), http://www.semp.us/publications/biotreader.php?BiotlD=653. Rev. Jacobson and his
lawyers had vigorously pressed what we would now call the fundamental rights/liberty interest
perspective. "Pickering and Ballard [Rev. Jacobson's counsel] claimed before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts that the Cambridge ordinance violated the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution. Their briefs were filled with colorful language and religious allusions. They claimed
that compulsory vaccination was a 'greater outrage than the scalping of a living victim by an Indian
93
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case itself is rightly used to address autonomy issues and countervailing state
interests, and it serves well within a tutorial on the nature and evolution of
standards of review in constitutional theory and adjudication.
Justice Harlan's majority opinion is regularly invoked both to support and
attack "compulsory" vaccination statutes. (As Professor Holland notes, there is
little statutory or decisional law authorizing actual forced vaccination. Whether
forced vaccination is worse than being fined-or worse than being imprisoned
for refusal to pay up-is interesting, but not pertinent here.) Although law-
trained persons regularly invoke the same cases to further opposing sides,
Jacobson in particular has something for everyone. Professor Holland argues that
Jacobson, as both the offspring of its time and as still-good (if uncertain) law,
should be read as affording strong protection for individual claims against
required vaccination, particularly when it is a condition for school attendance.
She contends that the case has been "expanded" by including children-in-school
within the scope of mandatory vaccination, and also by loosening the supposed
constraints of "necessity," "emergency," and threats to an "entire population."'17
Jacobson is an old case, and it is difficult to place ourselves within its
historical and contextual framework. It is also opaque, not simply in the sense
that it inevitably uses partially indeterminate concepts, but in the sense that its
formulations differ from ours and require a kind of translation into contemporary
terms. Even when we try to do this, it is hard to sort out whether the opinion
"always meant X" or has been "expanded (or contracted)" to mean X.
It is, then, a challenge to answer sensibly the question, "How would
Jacobson apply today?" It may be both that connotation and denotation of its key
terms have shifted. The operational language has certainly changed. So what
does this question mean? To note a simple real-world shift, the current and recent
incidence of smallpox is zero. The smallpox virus is said to exist in laboratories
only (unlike the polio virus); if not, it is now fully quiescent. The last U.S.
smallpox case was in 1949, and the last anywhere was in Somalia in
1977.' t There would be hardly any point in a compulsory vaccination program.19
savage or the tattooing of a captive of a South Sea Islander.' They ended their brief by proclaiming
that, 'here-in Massachusetts .. . a law complies a man to offer up his body to pollution and filth
and disease; that compels him to submit to the barbarous ceremonial of blood-poisoning and
virtually to say to the sick calf, 'Thou art my saviour: in thee do I trust,' and to bear ever after on
his defiled body literally and truly the MARK OF THE BEAST.") (alteration in original; internal
quotation mark omitted). Rev. Jacobson also said that he had experienced an adverse reaction to a
prior smallpox vaccination, as did one of his sons.
17. Holland, supra note 5, at 46-48.
18. See Smallpox Disease Overview, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (last updated Dec. 30, 2004).
19. Smallpox: Symptoms, Diagnosis and Treatment, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH INFO., http://health.
nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/smallpox/overview.html (last reviewed June 23, 2011). ("[T]he
United States stopped giving the smallpox vaccine in 1972. In 1980, the World Health Organization
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We, thus, need to ask a particular set of doctrinal questions, including: What
is the proper interpretation of Jacobson concerning the nature and strength of the
individual rights it recognized and-closely connected-concerning the burden
of justification placed on the state? How does this interpretation compare to our
current understanding of these rights and the burdens of justifying their
impairment? How would this current understanding be expressed in
contemporary articulations of standards of review? I address all of these
questions.
I think that Jacobson should be understood to protect (as we would now put
it) at least a "liberty interest." Although the Court's usage (and that of others) is
not entirely consistent, that term generally designates a right that does not draw
strict scrutiny (as do most "fundamental rights"),20 but nevertheless receives far
more protection than that afforded by the minimal rational basis test as used in
substantive due process cases. 21The operational standard of review for liberty
interests has been, in many cases, a form of intermediate scrutiny. This view of
Jacobson is not universal, and some accounts place the standard of review at or
near minimal scrutiny, although the issue is not always clearly put.22 One may
complain about discontinuous tiers and the inappropriateness of giving names to
standards of review (thus improperly reifying them, so the argument goes), but it
is one effective way of recognizing hierarchies of constitutional interests and
(perforce) of standards of review in some form. Some burdens of justification
placed on the state are maximal, some are minimal, and some are "intermediate,"
vaccinated against smallpox in the past. The vaccine is no longer given to the general public
because the virus has been wiped out. The possible complications and costs of the vaccine
outweigh the benefits of taking it. If the vaccine needs to be given to control an outbreak, it can
have a small risk of complications. Some complications are mild, such as rashes. Others are more
serious. Only military personnel, health care workers, and emergency responders may receive the
vaccine today. Smallpox vaccination policies and practices are currently being reviewed.").
20. The right to bear arms may be an exception. See infra note 60. Note also that "liberty
interests" are not always called "fundamental liberty interests," and it is unclear how the latter
differ, if at all, from fundamental rights. As I said, usage is not consistent. As for designating what
sort of individual interest the rational basis test "protects" in substantive due process, there seems to
be no official terminology; it is simply a claim of liberty that does not rise to "liberty-interest" or
fundamental rights status.
21. The rational basis test is sometimes used as a form of intermediate scrutiny in equal
protection cases. See infra text accompanying note 57.
22. Kenneth Wing, for example, stresses the strong degree of deference accorded the
legislature in Jacobson. KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC's HEALTH 25 (2007). All-
but-total deference is characteristic of minimal scrutiny, but even the strictest scrutiny requires (in
theory) serious attention to government justifications, and this will include important strands of
deference. (Courts are not going to rerun laboratory experiments.) Strict scrutiny is sometimes
satisfied, which is what one would expect-indeed, demand-of a non-per se rule. See, e.g.,
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality upholding electioneering restrictions). See
generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). With intermediate scrutiny, one
would expect intermediate degrees of deference.
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reflecting the status of the right. We cannot do without such orderings to tell us
the general direction of our analysis and where we are within it.
Jacobson's (operational) liberty interest was not watered down to cover
children, in school or out. Nor were its references to "necessity" and
"emergency" attenuated, further weakening the individual interests (somewhat
inexplicitly) recognized in the case. Professor Holland thinks otherwise
(bracketed remarks are mine):
Initial interpretation of Jacobson was circumspect. From 1907 to
1914, state appellate and supreme courts construed Jacobson as
permitting single vaccination mandates during smallpox
outbreaks. The courts upheld mandates and exclusion of
unvaccinated school children during emergencies. These
decisions applied an "oppressive or arbitrary" standard and
looked for evidence of public necessity, and, particularly, the
threat of epidemic. These decisions held that statutes must
incorporate medical exemptions. The decisions required that
school boards act in good faith and exclude unvaccinated
students only as long as the danger of smallpox endured.
Beginning in 1916, however, judicial interpretations of Jacobson
broadened. The Alabama Supreme Court read Jacobson to
contain the implied power to prevent epidemics, not simply to
respond to existing ones. [Is the author objecting to this, either
as an interpretive or policy matter?]A father sued the school
board for excluding his unvaccinated daughter from school when
there was no smallpox epidemic. [Doesn 't vaccination help to
prevent epidemics? Do we always have to wait until the sword is
loosed?] The court upheld the state's delegation of authority to
the school board and the state's right to prevent disease. The
decision also argued that mandates for children, and not adults,
were valid because a group of children "constitutes a condition
different, with respect to hygienic circumstances, effects, and
results, from that to be found in any other character of
assemblage in a municipality."The court deferred to municipal
authorities on public health.
. . . These decisions interpreted Jacobson expansively; in
neither situation was there an imminent danger or necessity for
the state to act in self-defense.23
Elsewhere, she argues:
The regulation [in Jacobson] excluded all children from
96
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compliance. The Court's paradigm [This term is tendentious; it is
not at all clear what the "paradigm" was; if it were clear, we
would be much clearer on the holding, but that is part of what is
at issue] was clear: a mandate is permissible in "an emergency,"
when there was "imminent danger," when "an epidemic of
disease . . . threatens the safety of [society's] members," when
there was "the pressure of great dan ers," and for an "epidemic
that imperiled an entire population."W
Professor Holland also contends that "Zucht [v. King, another smallpox
vaccination case] did shift Jacobson's paradigm, though, by upholding a
mandate exclusively for children, a subpopulation, and by affirming the
validity of a preventive mandate for a disease not in circulation." 25
But Justice Harlan used the term "emergency" only once, referring to what
was "necessary for the public health or the public safety," 26 -a not-very-
illuminating phrase. As for the departure from "necessity," there is no clear
explanation in the Article about what "necessity" or any "shift" from its use as a
standard mean. In interpreting the opinion, one should not invoke the language
referring to an "epidemic that imperiled an entire population" without also noting
that there was no such situation in Cambridge at the time, at least by the Court's
own description. The context of the quoted remark is this: "The state legislature
proceeded upon the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective,
if not the best-known, way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a smallpox
epidemic that imperiled an entire population."27 This is less a finding than a
statement about the legislature's theory of vaccination in setting up a general
program and did not address the specific situation in Cambridge.
As for conditions in Cambridge, Justice Harlan quoted Cambridge's board of
health, which had adopted a regulation under the aegis of state law:
Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city
of Cambridge, and still continues to increase; and whereas, it is
necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease that all
24. Id. at 8 (alternations in original) (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 12. The case reference is to Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). There, a child was
excluded from a public school because she had no certificate of vaccination and refused to be
vaccinated. She argued that she had been deprived of liberty without due process and deprived of
the equal protection of the laws, all under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, per Justice
Brandeis, dismissed the writ of error because it found "in the record no question as to the validity
of the ordinance sufficiently substantial to support the writ of error." Id. at 177. The Court,
nevertheless, referred favorably to Jacobson, stating that it had "settled that it is within the police
power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination." Id. at 176. The opinion does not state what
diseases were included within the vaccination program, but the lower court's opinion indicates that
smallpox was the target. Zucht v. King, 225 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). Because of the
procedural posture of the case, it is not clear what it held substantively, if anything.
26. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
27. Id. at 30-31.
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persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and
whereas, in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety
require the vaccination or revaccination of all the inhabitants of
Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants habitants of the
city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March Ist,
1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated. 28
There is nothing in Jacobson to indicate either that there was in fact an
ongoing catastrophe or that the city or the Court thought there was. The italicized
language simply recognizes the following: smallpox was present; it was
contagious and harmful if contracted; and a much worse situation could develop
and could and should be prevented. This is what "necessary" means here. It
clearly includes the idea of reasonably believing that something more serious
may develop out of current conditions. The idea that there has been some
departure from a sine qua non of disaster, or complete failure of a means toward
a goal, echoes the debate on the meaning of "necessity"-efficient or useful
versus absolutely physically necessary-underlying McCulloch v. Maryland.29
Moreover, "necessity" is systematically equivocal. It might refer to those
aspects of a situation that justify some liberty-impairing action. In Jacobson,
Justice Harlan ruled that it was not necessary to exclude all other useful
methods-a point doing double service for us by also telling us that a strict no-
less-intrusive-alternative standard was not in use.30 This softer "narrowing"
requirement of his reasonableness standard of course is perfectly consistent with
the functional status of Rev. Jacobson's claim as reflecting an important liberty
interest, though not with its possible status as an A-1 fundamental right drawing
the strictest scrutiny.
As for the claimed expansion to cover school children: first, children were
presumptively included within the mandate, and, second, this was not facially
limited to school attendance. "An exception is made in favor of 'children who
present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are unfit subjects
for vaccination."'31
When Jacobson was decided, the safety-benefit profile of smallpox
vaccination was not as well understood as it is today, and relatively few children
today would be considered unfit for vaccination-although it would not be
recommended for children under twelve months, or for persons under eighteen
under nonemergency circumstances, or for anyone with certain specified
28. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 408-09, 413-14 (1819).
30. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 ("Since, then, vaccination, as a means of protecting a community
against smallpox, finds strong support in the experience of this and other countries, no court, much
less a jury, is justified in disregarding the action of the legislature simply because in its or their
opinion that particular method was-perhaps, or possibly-not the best either for children or
adults." (emphasis added)).




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss1/3
HOLLAND RESPONSE AND EXPANSION
conditions.32 After all, we do not have smallpox anymore so there is nothing
imminent or even possible (barring accidental release or, say, a monkey pox
breakout into something like an old-style smallpox threat).33 In any case, the
issue of extensive coverage of children was not at issue in Jacobson, and there is
nothing in the opinion to indicate that children-even children exclusively-
cannot properly be the subjects of a vaccination program.34
In this light, it is too loose to describe Jacobson's "paradigm" as involving
"'emergency," "imminent danger" (in any restricted sense), or epidemics
threatening "entire populations." It is not entirely clear what the paradigm is.35 It
is, thus, uncertain what would constitute a "shift" of a paradigm. The Zucht
children/school context does not clearly constitute an augmentation of a clear set
of defining (necessary and sufficient) conditions or even of a specific cluster of
criteria that might justify compulsory vaccination. In any case, as I suggested, to
refer to shifts in paradigms requires specifying what the paradigm island there is
a difference between applying the selfsame paradigm to a new situation as
opposed to "shifting" it. This is the main difference between Jacobson and Zucht.
Thus, there is a major three-way distinction to be drawn between correctly
applying a precedent to new situations; incorrectly applying it to those situations;
and changing the rules, standards, or principles involved to cover something
unjustifiably covered under that precedent because of the incorrect application.
True, it is often difficult to distinguish between an incorrect application and an
expanded application-in some cases, impossible. But the distinction remains,
and lawyers are accustomed to distinguishing-sometimes successfully-
between a mistaken use of a prior case and its alteration, whether by reasonable
extension or by overruling. We will, however, never be rid of having to choose
between saying "these earlier cases have always meant X' and "these earlier
cases are being utterly misread by my colleagues." Still, it is precisely because
Jacobson is unclear that we cannot definitively say that it has not swollen beyond
32. Emergency Preparedness and Response-Vaccine Overview: The Smallpox Vaccine,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
vaccination/facts.asp (last reviewed Feb. 7, 2007).
33. Wendy Orent, Will Monkeypox Be the Next Smallpox? The Thought of a New Human
Poxvirus Evolving Under Our Noses Is Unsettling, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, http://www.
latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-orent-pox-20100926,0,6800911. story. According to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, monkeypox, also a serious infection, is preventable
via the smallpox vaccine. Smallpox Vaccine and Monkeypox, Monkeypox Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/monkeypox/smallpoxvaccine
mpox.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2008).
34. It seems pretty well agreed today that some vaccination programs really do save lives and
resources. I suppose smallpox is the gold standard. "The eradication of smallpox in the 1970s, by
targeted use of smallpox vaccine, has not only prevented many thousands of deaths, but is
estimated to have saved US $1.2 billion annually in the 25 years since the last case was reported."
D. Isaacs et al., Should Routine Childhood Immunizations Be Compulsory?, 40 J. PAEDIATRICS &
CHILD HEALTH 392 (2004).
35. See infra Part IlI.
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its boundaries.
More generally, many, perhaps most, claims about the expansion,
contraction, or distortion of a precedent are normatively ambiguous-that is, they
might be interpreted as empirical claims, value claims, or both, and it may be
difficult to untangle these strands. One would expect, for example, that those
opposed to a particular new application of a concept or standard will view it as
an expansion of what seems to have been in force. But here we have the familiar
problem of distinguishing expansion of denotation by virtue of change of facts
and expansion of meaning.3 6
To illustrate, consider Professor Wing's observation: "Today, we do not
demand the threat of a pending epidemic to require childhood immunizations for
school, suggesting perhaps that the standard for 'necessity' has relaxed
considerably as the benefits and general safety of immunizations have become
better established." 37
But it is not clear that Jacobson ever required such a threat. In any case, we
have to distinguish conceptual change from conceptual application-to-new-
circumstances. It may be that precisely the same standards with the same
conceptual meanings are in play in a new situation, pitting several variables
against each other that may resolve differently from prior interplay in a different
case. A high-risk vaccine requires a high-risk disease in order to justify even
voluntary vaccination. But if newly developed vaccines for the same malady are
far safer, the balance is different and compulsion may be more justifiable.
Perhaps some malady has-been later found to be either more dangerous-or less
so, or both, in different ways; this too would change the balance. Facts may
change while meaning may not. There is much more commerce among the states
these days, so there are many more situations covered by the commerce clause,3 8
even if the conceptual meaning of the clause remained unchanged (which it
probably did not). Of course, if the conceptual meaning becomes more
expansive, coverage is even more amplified, as all constitutional lawyers know.
Both augmentations have been at work in the commerce clause.39
So, it is no simple matter to sort out the meanings of Jacobson, given all the
variations in facts, possible changes in public values, and the continuing
reformulations of standards of review. But I think that the case is clear enough
for us to say that Professor Holland's conclusion is overstated (italicized
comments in brackets are mine):
36. See Melvin Fitting, Intensional Logic, 2006; rev. 2011, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intensional (last updated Jan. 27, 2011).
37. WING, supra note 22, at 63.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
39. On shifts in denotation resulting from both empirical changes and changes of meaning, see
Michael H. Shapiro, Argument Selection in Constitutional Law: Choosing and Reconstructing
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Courts have used Jacobson to justify results that the original
decision did not condone: vaccination mandates exclusively for
children, with no imminent disease outbreaks, and with serious
penalties for noncompliance. [There is a big difference between
saying Jacobson did not directly deal with some variable and
saying that it would not have 'justified" or could not have
applied to the current result. Nothing in Jacobson foreclosed, for
example, vaccinations exclusively for children. At most, it was
simply beyond the issue presented at that time, but not excluded
by anything said in the case. Indeed, the Court acknowledges the
application to children, subject to exclusions. Jacobson's
language does not justify a conclusion that the results about
which the author complains were unjustifiable under its terms.]
Punishments include loss of education, social isolation, parents'
loss of custodial rights, child neglect sanctions against parents,
and, even, forced vaccination. In Jacobson and Zucht, the
Supreme Court upheld mandates for one vaccine during airborne
epidemics. [The Court did not uphold much on the merits in
Zucht because it declined to rule on them and dismissed the writ
of error. It nevertheless referred with favor to Jacobson.]Courts
have expanded the original Jacobson precedent dramatically.
[There are cases described by the author in which courts have
indeed been too deferential. But this does not necessarily mean
that Jacobson had been "expanded" rather than misapplied.
Over deference is not justified by Jacobson and is arguably
inconsistent with it.40
B. What did Jacobson say?
It is hard to understand Jacobson-but not that hard. It helps to check both
what it said and what it did. Here are some major questions about Jacobson, and
any reconstructions of it in contemporary language.
m What is the proper characterization of the right as recognized in Jacobson?
How does it connect to plausible current characterizations?
m What is the operational standard of review? (There are always implicit or
explicit standards of review in any valid constitutional argument that has to
resolve competing constitutional claims.)
m What did the Court think the material facts and public values were?
m What caveats did the Court itself issue about its ruling? These could serve
as interpretive guides.
m How would Jacobson be decided today?
101
40. Holland, supra note 5, at 53-54.
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1. The Characterization of the Right
The best source on this is Justice Harlan himself:
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may
assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government,-especially of any free
government existing under a written constitution, to interfere
with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in every
well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the
safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. 41
This is not wholly unlike what we read today in major opinions of the
Supreme Court. The second Justice Harlan said, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman and
quoted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
It [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause] is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment. 42
But the first Justice Harlan's account does not tell us as much as we need to
know, then or now. There is no precise description of the right. It is not couched
as a matter of bodily integrity or personal security or "the right to define one's
own concept of existence."43 Moreover, there is no way to tell, however flowery
the language, the "constitutional value" of the right until we see how it is pitted
against the state's claim that its coercion is justified. We need to probe for the
standard of review and how it is used.
41. Jacobson,197 U.S. at 29.
42. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
Evidently somewhat out of control, the Court in Casey said: "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 1 suppose I would rather have liberty described too expansively than
too narrowly, but without knowing more about the meaning of "liberty" at issue, this account is too
boundless even for a constitutional standard. In any case, the quoted remark can't be taken as a
rigorous expression of current doctrine.
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2. The Jacobson Standard of Review
The loosely stated standard of review is contained within the same passage
that extolled the claimant's liberty. One asks whether the regulation is
"reasonable ... as the safety of the general public may demand.',44 The language
is not unlike that in McCulloch v. Maryland and, a bit later, in Lochner v. New
York. 45 But this does not tell us much either. In McCulloch, Chief Justice
Marshall inquired into the national bank's functions even less carefully than
Justice Harlan examined Cambridge's findings and valuations. McCulloch was,
in modern terms, closer to the nominal rational basis test than to strict scrutiny-
despite the warnings about "pretextual" government action that evades
constitutional limitations. In Lochner, it seems fairly clear that the
"reasonableness" language served as a form of strict scrutiny for Justice
Peckham. Under pressure from the majority, Justice Harlan's dissent was far
more elaborate in its scrutiny of New York's law than was his examination of
Cambridge's action, but in the end it seems his standard of review was similar to
the one he used in Jacobson the year before.
I do not think that Jacobson is a case of minimal scrutiny and maximal or
automatic deference. There is no reason not to take Justice Harlan's warnings
about governmental abuse seriously. But there is not much of a case to be made
for strict scrutiny. The proper level of scrutiny is somewhere in the middle.
3. The Court's Caveats
The Court's caveats about the limits of its ruling do not reveal anything
different from the preceding account; they simply reinforce it. Against the claim
of government power, the opinion insists, "[I]f a statute purporting to have been
enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has
no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the dut of the
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." And,
addressing the needs of vulnerable persons, the Court conceded that government
"might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the
public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such
persons." 47 The Court elaborated the last point a bit later:
It is easy ... to suppose the case of an adult who is embraced by
the mere words of the act, but yet to subject whom to vaccination
in a particular condition of his health or body would be cruel and
44. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29.
45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
46. Jacobson,197 U.S. at 31.
47. Id. at 28.
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inhuman in the last degree. We are not to be understood as
holding that the statute was intended to be applied to such a case,
or, if it was so intended, that the judiciary would not be
competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the
individual concerned.48
But against more general claims of right, Justice Harlan said:
It is not . . . true that the power of the public to guard itself
against imminent danger depends in every case involving the
control of one's body upon his willingness to submit to
reasonable regulations established by the constituted authorities,
under the sanction of the state, for the Turpose of protecting the
public collectively against such danger.
Once again, I see neither strict scrutiny nor the nothingness of the
substantive due process rational basis test.
III.TODAY'S CONSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHIES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO OLD AND NEW BIOMEDICAL CONTEXTS
A. Jacobson 2.1 :Key Questions
We should distinguish between Jacobson 2.0 and Jacobson 2.1. The former
would ask how the same Court at the same time would decide the case under
present day epidemiological, vaccinological, and medical treatment conditions
concerning smallpox. 50 (A literal Jacobson 2.0 should not uphold compulsory
vaccination, given the apparent demise of smallpox.) I think it more instructive,
however, to ask a different set of questions. Jacobson 2.1, on the other hand, is a
thoroughly modem case involving someone making the same claim (without any
religious aspects, to keep things simpler) under current conditions and doctrines.
First, the broad question, "How would Jacobson be decided today by a
contemporary Court?," is too unfocused for any clear answer. It could mean any
of several things:
m How would the case be decided today on the exact same
epidemiological and medical facts that existed in Cambridge in 1902?
n How would it be decided given the current status of smallpox
threats?
48. Id. at 38-39.
49. Id at 29-30.
50. Medical treatment of smallpox may benefit from modem antivirals, but evidently there is
no specific medicine or other treatment accepted for smallpox treatment. Smallpox I Description I
Prevention I Causes and Symptoms I Treatment, MODERN MED. GUIDE, http://www.
modernmedicalguide.com/smallpox-description-prevention-causes-and-symptoms-treatment (last
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m How would it be decided in any given case involving a given
disorder; a particular kind of vaccine indicated for it; manufactured and
distributed in a particular way; and given specific local, regional, national, and
international facts about the disorder and the surrounding situation?
m In particular (given the Article's focus): How would it be decided
when applied to hepatitis B vaccine programs as applied to children as a
condition for entry into (pre)school?
The overarching question is, "What argument structure would the Court
use?" This involves many constituent questions: What rights characterization
would it use to identify the right and its constitutional value? What would be the
standard of review, given the right's constitutional value and the nature of its
impairment? How would that standard be used to vet matters of technical
scientific dispute and the government's value judgments, implicit or explicit? An
important linked question in the vaccination context, more pertinent now than in
1905 is whether there is a constitutional, moral, or policy problem with
"piggybacking" vaccination and other public health programs onto society's
educational missions?
There are parallel inquiries that suggest additional shades of important
meaning:
n If we translate into modem terms Jacobson's argument structure, which
embraces constitutional values as recognized in the 1905 decision, what do we
get? In the century-plus since then, we have not transmogrified into a world so
different and bearing such a locked-in perspective that the comparison involves
"incommensurable" values.51
m Would Jacobson's argument structure be revised to explicitly recognize
different constitutional valuations by characterizing a set of related but
nonidentical rights? For example, might the Court recognize a top-level
fundamental right of personal security, comprehending the integrities of body,
mind, and identity, and generating strict scrutiny? (This may be what Professor
Holland prefers.) Would it instead run away with maximal deference (retaining
some special scrutiny for highly vulnerable persons-those who might die of an
allergic reaction to a vaccine or its additives, for example)? This would treat the
"right" as a liberty claim (i.e., invoking the liberty clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or both) with no special status, meriting
only minimal scrutiny. Would it instead recognize a "liberty interest" in the
current sense, drawing intermediate scrutiny? Would it borrow from equal
protection jurisprudence and ramp up the rational basis test without
acknowledging it to be intermediate scrutiny?
There is no reason to think that Jacobson 2.1, decided on the same medical
or epidemiological facts acknowledged for Cambridge in 1905, would be decided
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differently today. (I will not discuss the argument formulation, in current terms,
if Rev. Jacobson 2.1 made an explicit claim under the free exercise clause, except
to say that it would probably fail under Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v.
Smith52and even under pre-Smith doctrine.)
However, there is ambiguity here. What does it mean to ask whether
Jacobson would be decided "the same way" today? One could have in mind
either the same facts prevailing in Cambridge when the case was brought or facts
involving other health threats that are at least equally serious. 53 Moreover,
52. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (ruling that with laws of general
application-i.e., not targeting the protected interest in question, which in this case is free exercise
of religion-there is no heightened scrutiny of claimed burdens on free exercise).
53. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and
Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576 (2005) ("If the Court today were to decide
Jacobson once again, the analysis would likely differ-to account for developments in
constitutional law-but the outcome would certainly reaffirm the basic power of government to
safeguard the public's health . . . . Supreme Court jurisprudence has progressed markedly from the
deferential tone of Jacobson and its progressive-era embrace of the social compact. The Warren
Court, within the context of the civil rights movement, transformed constitutional law. The Court
developed its "tiered" approach to due process and equal protection that placed a constitutional
premium on the protection of liberty interests. Thus, the question arises: Would Jacobson be
decided the same way if it were presented to the Court today? The answer is indisputably yes, even
if the style and the reasoning would differ." Id. at 576, 580. 1 think that when mapped against the
questions I unpacked in the text, this account is consistent with my own parallel answers. But the
concept of "being decided the same way" is quite ambiguous. Separating the possibilities is
important for the present analysis. It is possible that the Court would be somewhat less deferential
in both tone and action, but there is a wide range of deferential stances between the strictest and the
loosest scrutinies, and even strict scrutiny involves deference to legislative empirical findings and
value preferences. The exact content of this deference will have to be specified through a variety of
cases that test the operational meaning of all levels of scrutiny.) See infra Part III; see also Wendy
K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v Massachusetts: It's Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather's Public
Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 586 (2005) ("A law that authorizes mandatory
vaccination to prevent dangerous contagious diseases in the absence of an epidemic, such as the
school immunization requirement summarily upheld in 1922, also would probably be upheld as
long as (1) the disease still exists in the population where it can spread and cause serious injury to
those infected, and (2) a safe and effective vaccine could prevent transmission to others."). See
generally Arnold J. Rosoff with Shana Siegel, Treatment Without Express Consent, in TREATISE ON
HEALTH CARE LAW § 17.05 (Matthew Bender/LexisNexis, 2010) ("In recent years, some courts
have shown a greater skepticism toward claims of necessity for public health measures and an
increasing sensitivity toward preservation of individual rights. Thus, if the Jacobson case were to
arise today, probing questions might be asked about the seriousness of the health threat being
addressed, the safety and efficacy of the inoculations, and the weight of the personal burdens and
risks, if any, upon the citizens affected. While inoculations to combat smallpox would likely
withstand such scrutiny-as have mandatory vaccination of school children, 56 mandatory blood
tests for persons applying for a marriage license, mandatory examination, treatment, and/or
quarantine of persons suspected of transmitting communicable diseases, 57 the fluoridation of
public water supplies, etc.-other public health measures, particularly such controversial measures
as mandatory testing for HIV infection, very well might not."). See generally Wendy E. Parmet,
POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 38-42 (2009) ("As the dreaded epidemics of previous
centuries began to fade from memory, the necessity of public health interventions became less
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deciding "the same way" does not necessarily mean that the same argument
structure or underlying values would be applied. That is, "the same way" could
refer to a similar (perhaps identical) adjudicatory outcome, or to the outcome as
informed by the argument structure leading to it. The same adjudicatory outcome
may result from differing argument structures and values.54 This is a good time to
make the transition to an explicit question: "How would the modem Court (or the
Court of the moment, writing here in 2011) frame the substantive issues
(assumed to be properly presented within the current limits of the judicial power)
in cases of vaccination generally and vaccination of school children in
particular?" The facts are, of course, highly variable, but not so ineffable that this
question is meaningless. The question is not just about Jacobson or Jacobson 2.0,
but about Jacobson 2.1 (and beyond).
B. The Article's Attempted Reconstruction
There are reconstructions and reconstructions. The target here is Jacobson
2.1-a contemporary vaccination case using contemporary articulations of
constitutional values. One can also try to reconstruct the case in the sense of
simply clarifying it in its own terms. Although both Justice Harlans are noted for
their lucidity, Jacobson could be easier to follow. Professor Holland seems to
combine both tasks here: clarifying the case as it stands, and presenting an
account of what would or should happen now in at least some public health and
vaccination cases. She suggests that some latter-day Justices would have
recognized a right against vaccination as fundamental, but the case for this is
shaky. In any case, in pursuing the reconstruction of Jacobson, she follows in
accepted. At the same time, with less fear of contagious diseases, public health became less salient
to both the culture and the law. Indeed, following Jacobson, the Supreme Court would not again
face a question so starkly and directly related to a community's response to an imminent
epidemic.") Question: Do these apparent attitude shifts reflect a value change or the application of
constant values to changing facts? If the former, did the changing facts influence a rethinking of
our values?
54. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 216-21, 241-49.
55. Holland, supra note 5, at 83. Professor Holland also believes that some Justices would
have recognized a right against vaccination as fundamental. "Some of the Justices who participated
in the personal autonomy decisions, notably Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
would likely have found the right to refuse vaccination a 'fundamental' right and would have
subjected the state's regulation to 'strict scrutiny."' Id. I doubt this, but for some Justices, the claim
is not outlandish. Still, it is not clear whether resisting vaccination involves one of "the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Planned
Parenthood Of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Indeed, broad as this formulation is,
vaccination fits uncertainly within it. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State." Id. at 851. Does fear of remote though serious adversities fall within this? Perhaps
vaccination represents too trivial a threat to the sanctity of personhood to merit status within the
107
21
Shapiro: Updating Constitutional Doctrine
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
part the analysis of Professor Gostin. Neither seems to be suggesting that the
matrix of variables presented should be understood simply as a reconstruction of
Jacobson in modem terms. Rather, it is a preferred set of factors for any rational
decision.
The proposed matrix contains the factors of "necessity," "reasonable
means," "proportionality," and "harm avoidance" as a way to both illuminate
Jacobson and inform current public policy. As Professor Gostin puts it:
Jacobson 's social-compact theory was in tension with its theory
of limited government. Beyond its passive acceptance of state
discretion in matters of public health was the Court's first
systematic statement of the constitutional limitations imposed on
government. Jacobson established a floor of constitutional
protection that consists of 4 overlapping standards: necessity,
reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance. These
standards, while permissive of public health intervention,
nevertheless required a deliberative governmental process to
safeguard liberty. 56
As a reconstruction of Jacobson, this seems both useful and harmless; it
does not take any liberties with the opinion.
Professor Holland, however, later invokes a significantly enlarged matrix as
a clarification of Jacobson. She asks, in her hepatitis B hypothetical:
How might the Supreme Court balance the interests of the state
and the child? The Court would have to look to Jacobson and
Zucht for a balancing test on vaccination for school attendance
and to the Court's more recent precedents on personal autonomy
to decide this case. The Court would have to review the
following factors [public health necessity; reasonable means;
proportionality; harm avoidance; non-discrimination; liberq5
interest in due process; and liberty interest in equal protection].
This list of things the Court would consider in compelled vaccination cases
certainly contains considerations that would be relevant in most cases. But the
author asks, "How might the Court balance the interests of the state and child,"
without first characterizing the right(s) at stake and specifying the entailed
mantle of a fundamental right or liberty interest.
56. Gostin, supra note 53, at 579.
57. Holland, supra note 5, at 67. 1 do not know to what "liberty interest in equal protection"
refers. It is not an impossible or incoherent concept, but the term "liberty" is not, in constitutional
law, ordinarily used to refer to our interest in being treated equally. However, it may refer to those
fundamental rights (indeed construed as liberties), that are thought (by some) to be derived only or
largely from the equal protection clause, e.g., the right to vote in state elections. See Harper v. Va.
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standard(s) of review. Instead, she jumps the threshold stage, and straightaway
starts parsing the factors that specify the constitutional metric. This is backwards.
I do not mention this as a point of literary criticism or esthetic preference or
technical nitpicking. This is a matter of basic constitutional logic. Describing the
"liberty interest" at stake is not something one simply throws into the "balance";
it is-in constitutional adjudication-an issue that is a starting point for
substantive analysis. (The matter, to be sure, is complicated by the fact that there
is bound to be some bounce-back between threshold valuation, analysis of
government justifications, re-valuation of threshold matters, and so on.)
The elements of the matrix also include some anomalous and/or hard to
understand entries. The references to a "liberty interest in equal protection" and
to "proportionality" are especially problematic, as I will explain. There are also
some technical problems with her account of current doctrine concerning the
characterization of rights/liberty interests and the set of available standards of
review. I discuss this in Section III.C, below.
C. A Note on Constitutional Values and Their Entailments: Standards ofReview
as Inherent in Adjudication and as Heuristics
I make a few points briefly. I said in one article:
The Constitution, at least as currently interpreted, embeds or
encodes a hierarchy (or perhaps an ascending continuum) of
values, and different standards of review are meant to track
differences in constitutional value by placing very different
burdens on government to justify its actions in different
situations. In this sense, the constitution is both a repository and
an engine for executing basic values.59
The Constitution embeds values, sorts them, and operationally commits us (if
we take it as authoritatively calling for implementation) to things we now call
"standards of review."To dwell on these standards is not a case of the tail
wagging the dog; they are the dog. They are different aspects of the concept of
58. I have explained these points at greater length elsewhere. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at
269-71, 295-97; Shapiro, supra note 8, at 356-64.
59. See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 269-70; see also Shapiro, supra note 8 ("If constitutional
hierarchies are recognized by converging interpretive theories and are taken seriously, they must be
operationally reflected in standards of review of one sort or another. If they are not, then there are
no hierarchies in the first place. To put it crisply, if constitutional hierarchy (among legal relations
and their associated constitutional values) is accepted, to implement the hierarchy is to select and
apply a standard of review. Doing so is embedded in realizing the hierarchy. Put otherwise,
implementing a constitutional hierarchy amounts to the application of a standard of review.")
(emphasis omitted). Id. at 366.As I noted in that article, some "hierarchies" are so simple one may
be inclined to say that they are not hierarchies at all, as in "the President always wins.") But that is
not how we operate, at least in theory, and probably not in fact. Id. at 359-60; see also id. at 354.
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rights-as-authoritatively-implemented. They are not egregious artifacts that mask
circularity, although they-along with many conceptual devices-can be used
tendentiously to do so. But there is nothing in this account that dictates their
exact formulation, or that they are to be ordered into tiers or step-functions
separated by thresholds of constitutional value and of their impairments, as
opposed to "spectra."
Still, standards of review, as the logical entailments of interpreting the
constitution to find value hierarchies have taken certain crystallized forms. Both
high theory and everyday adjudication have to take account of this, as the next
few points about Jacobson show.
D. Technical Difficulties with the Article's Doctrinal Account
The Article to which I am responding presents itself as much more than a
commentary on policy. It is a call for implementing constitutional values via
adjudication and legislation. So, marking out the doctrine precisely is both a
practical necessity and integral to theory.
Here is a passage from Professor Holland's article; again, the italicized,
bracketed remarks are mine, as are footnotes.
It is not certain what standard of review the Supreme Court
would apply to a state compulsory vaccination mandate today.[If
constitutional valuations have changed since Jacobson, the
question should be, "What standard of review is required, given
the (new) rights valuation, for modern vaccination and various
other public health/coercion cases?"] The Supreme Court
decided Jacobson before it had adopted explicit standards for
review of government authority. In Jacobson, the Court required
only that Massachusetts's statute be rationally related to the
purpose of eradicating infectious disease. Since the 1940s,
however, as Part II explores, the Court has held that a higher
standard must apply if a state law impinges on a fundamental
liberty interest. For a law to be constitutional under a strict
scrutiny test, the highest standard, there must be a compelling
governmental interest and the law must be narrowly tailored to
achieve its end. [Although the formal and informal terminologies
are somewhat inconsistent, fundamental rights usually (not
always) 60 draw stricter scrutiny than mere "liberty interests. "
60. Cf Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593-94 (2008) (referring to the right to bear
arms as having become fundamental to Englishmen). For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the
characterization is clearer in McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 3025 (2010) (holding that under
the Fourteenth Amendment the right to bear arms is fundamental and applies to the states). Neither
case applied strict scrutiny, as far as I can tell-certainly not in express terms. Both cases may be
counterexamples to the once-usual usual practice of assigning strict scrutiny to fundamental rights.
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(Justice Scalia seems to use 'fundamental rights" and
'fundamental liberty interests" synonymously.)6' The liberty
interests recognized in Casey and Cruzan62did not draw strict
scrutiny. Each case must be examined on its own, to some extent,
and sweeping accounts of Court terminology are, even after all
this time, still premature in this arena.]In cases where strict
scrutiny does not apply, the Supreme Court usually uses the
lowest standard, the rational basis test. The rational basis test
applies when the rights at stake are not considered fundamental.
[This is incomplete. It ignores, to this point at least, intermediate
scrutiny-the middle tier. Note again Casey, Cruzan, Romeo,
and Harper-all liberty interest cases, but no strict scrutiny.63
The author's later comment on souped-up rational basis is only
one form of intermediate scrutiny, and it seems, so far, to apply
only in equal protection. Admittedly, the Court has been very
loose about describing the standards of review attached to
liberty interests, usually eschewing even the term "intermediate
scrutiny. "But whatever these standards are called, it remains
that strict scrutiny is greater than intermediate-scrutiny-for-
liberty-interests, which is greater than rational-basis-for-due-
process.]Under this standard of review, "if a law neither burdens
a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold
the [law] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end."[The Court itself in Romer v. Evans was unfortunately
speaking loosely here, and left out its middle tier. Whatever the
Justices say in their looser moments, the doctrinal reality is
more complex.]
Between these two extremes of strict scrutiny and rational basis
opinion used the terms "liberty interest," "fundamental liberty interest," and "fundamental right"-
all on the same page-in describing a parent's right to control the care and upbringing of her child.
The Court clearly acted with heightened scrutiny, but the standard of review was not specifically
described.
61. "Our opinions applying the doctrine known as 'substantive due process' hold that the Due
Process Clause prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)). To some extent, this compounds the confusion among these terms.
62. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing-not assuming
arguendo-a liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical treatment; the assumption arguendo was
limited to viewing artificial nutrition and hydration as medical treatment); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally impaired inmate in civil institution had a
liberty interest in personal security); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (ruling that a
prisoner had a liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs).
63. In Harper, the claimant was a convicted, incarcerated prisoner and thus his claim received
intermediate scrutiny under Turner v. Safley; if the interest protected is less than a fundamental
right, it would probably draw less-than-strict scrutiny whatever the setting. But recall that the
fundamental rights found in Heller and McDonald apparently didn't generate strict scrutiny.
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review, the Supreme Court has required an intermediate level of
scrutiny or a "pumped-up" rational basis test for liberty interests
after Jacobson. [In the first place, the only domain ofpumped-up
rationality seems to be equal protection, not substantive due
process, although some claim Lawrence v. Texas to be an
exception. In the second place, the equal protection rational
basis test on steroids is not the only form of intermediate
scrutiny.]In these cases, the Supreme Court has struck down
questionable state laws on the grounds that the state interest did
not outweigh an individual's liberty interest. [This is primarily,
perhaps exclusively, a matter of equal protection. The account
again leaves out intermediate scrutiny for liberty interests as
framed within substantive due process. There may be a liberty
interest branch, as well as a fundamental rights branch to equal
protection, the former drawing intermediate scrutiny]"4
E. An Outline ofJacobson 2.1: What Kind ofRight, of What Value, and Bearing
Which Standard ofReview?
1. What Is the Right and What Do We Call It?
The difficulty in predicting general constitutional development (as opposed
to outcomes in particular cases) is overestimated. It all depends on how one
characterizes the asserted outcome or development. Accurate predictions-
admittedly with low informational content-are easy to come by, and the
information is not entirely empty. If the late columnist Drew Pearson could be
eighty-four percent accurate, so can constitutional lawyers.65 Prediction: the
Court is not going to dismantle all fundamental rights all at once. We know this.
Perhaps we can, then, predict a meaningful range of responses for Jacobson 2.1.
How would the right be described? And what considerations do we draw on
when answering this? One characterization immediately comes to mind. The
right not to be vaccinated could be called, "The right not to be vaccinated
(whether with a stick, a pill, a scratch, etc.)." After all, it is all a form of battery
(speaking loosely), even if administered with a Star Trekian hypospray.66 This
64. Holland, supra note 5, at 48. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985)).
65. You have to have to been around a while to remember this; Pearson (the columnist, not the
football player) died in 1969. Jim Heintze, Books and Articles by and About Drew Pearson: A
Selective Bibliography of Print Materials (last visited Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.Iibrary.american.
edu/pearson/bibliography.html.
66. For a general formulation (not specifically keyed to hyposprays), see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) ("At common law, even the touching of one person by
another without consent and without legal justification was a battery. Before the turn of the century,
this Court observed that '[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
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designation, however, seems oddly particular and unilluminatin . What happened
to integrity of mind, body, identity, and personhood generally? Still, the Court
in Harper spoke of the prisoner's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, holding that
it is a liberty interest. This, too, was oddly restricted. Does the liberty interest
include antidepressant drugs also? Or did the Court think its description covered
that and all medical- sychotropics? Why not "personal security," as in
Youngberg v. Romeo, or "bodily integrity," as mentioned in passing in
Washington v. Glucksberg?70 Are these descriptions curiously broad? Probably
not. Personal security generally, and the integrity of body, mind and identity
more particularly may be as good as we can get now, although technology
(among other things) will press us to be more precise on what we mean
operationally by our constitutional valuations and the standards of review they
entail.7 1
The freestanding terms "autonomy" and "privacy" are too fat and too
equivocal to rely on in precisely describing the right. If this is not already
clear, it should become so as we move on.
2. What Is the Standard ofReview and What Do We Call It?
The last time the Court newly characterized something as a fundamental
right-the right to bear arms, in McDonald v. City of Chicago 72-it declined to
assign any named standard of review. But we know standards of review are not
elective: the constitutional value of an interest and its standard of review are not
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law.' This notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is
generally required for medical treatment." (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891))).
67. One who resists vaccination might object that the procedure does not cohere with "who
she is"-her identity. Of course, vaccination in itself poses no direct threat to literal
physical/mental identity.
68. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990) (ruling that "respondent possesses a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
69. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314, 315, 319 (1982) (grouping it among
"fundamental liberties" and referring to it as a "liberty interest"; also holding that "Romeo retains
liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily restraint").
70. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
71. As we saw, the Court does speak of bodily integrity from time to time. Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, at 896; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269, and of personal
security, Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 at 315. 1 do not try to explicate rigorously the overlapping ideas
of the integrity of body, mind, and identity, and do not address issues of reducing any of these
categories to any of the others.
72. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 3025 (2010). Its direct antecedent, Dist. of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) alluded to the fundamental rights of Englishmen but did not actually
say the right to bear arms was a fundamental right under the American constitution. McDonald,
however, said fairly clearly that both the pure Second Amendment right and the parallel Fourteenth
Amendment right are fundamental.
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simply entangled: they are interdefinable.73 They derive from the same
overarching and authoritative conceptual structure. Whatever standard of review
is linked to the right to bear arms under the Fourteenth Amendment, it led to the
remand in McDonald. Although this litigation did not survive the repeal of the
Chicago and Oak Park ordinances, 74 the standard used would clearly have been
some form of heightened scrutiny, even if not so described. Strict scrutiny itself
has not been officially foreclosed.75 After all, the value of a right is reflected
largely through its standard of review. If one is confused about the correct
standard of review, one is necessarily confused about the constitutional value of
the interests in contention.
Jacobson 2.1, then, will be characterized ultimately by the standard of
review used, implicitly or explicitly, however the opinion describes the right in
question.76 Perhaps neither the right nor the review standard will be clearly
stated. To some degree, this is inevitable: the Court might formulate a right, but
not be sure how to rank it. Moreover, there are tactical and political reasons for
obscuring even the logical entailments of what one says. It may thus wish to be
circumspect about how to describe the standard, given that it is supposed to
implement a right of still-uncertain constitutional value.
But the doctrinal/logical fact remains: to characterize a right and decline-
perhaps openly-to specify its standard of review suggests that something has
provoked a departure from what might be considered basic judicial
transparency.77The Court's grasp of what it was doing is askew, its confidence
73. See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (2006).
74. Afterwards, Chicago and Oak Park repealed their respective ordinances, rendering the case
moot. National Rifle Ass'n v. City of Chi., 393 Fed.Appx. 390 (7th Cir. 2010).
75. Justice Breyer complained that Justice Scalia had not specified a standard of review.
Justice Scalia complained about the complaint. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634
(2008).
76. In Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, the right to personal security was implemented, after a
fashion, through the professional judgment standard, which involved very substantial deference to
government. The relative absence of clear professional standards for treating severely mentally
impaired persons was thought to require this, although one could argue that such impenetrability
cuts the other way: the Court is simply deferring to a black box. See generally MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO
ET AL., BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 408-412 (2003). One might well
ask whether and when such deference vindicates the rule of law or weakens it.
77. It is not uncommon for courts to use standards of review (which they must) without
identifying or explaining them, but in most cases it's clear enough what they are doing. Even in
Heller, for example, the standard of review is clearly heightened, although one may well argue, as
did Justice Breyer, that greater precision was called for. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570. Still, full
disclosure was not jurisprudentially imperative. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971),
Justice Harlan did not use any words of art to signal his use of strict scrutiny until nearly the end of
the opinion (state needed a "particularized and compelling reason" for criminalizing the use of an
offensive word). There is no need to canvass the various reasons and explanations for circling





Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss1/3
HOLLAND RESPONSE AND EXPANSION
that it is correct is weak, or some rhetorical maneuver is needed for value
reinforcement or political accommodation. When matters become more sorted
out, however, it will be quite irrational to characterize the right but to decline to
specify the standard of review. It is like trying to withhold one side of a plane
surface when delivering the other.
The chance that the Court will recognize a top-grade fundamental-right-
78
with-strict-scrutiny is pretty low for the vaccination field, simply based on past
performance. Recall that although Harper involved a prisoner, subject to the
middling Turner v. Safley standard of review, the Court nowhere hinted that the
liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs would generate strict scrutiny
outside of a prison (or other confinement?) context.
On the other hand, however loose (in some eyes) the Jacobson decision was
in allowing personal interests to be invaded by government, it did not apply
minimal scrutiny, and the modem Court is also unlikely to do so. True, the
Jacobson Court did seem to apply the "reasonableness" standard (not to be
confused with the "rationality" standard) rather more loosely there than it did the
following year in Lochner v. New York. (Lochner's majority opinion was written
by Justice Peckham, who dissented without opinion in Jacobson.) There, the
standard, whatever it was called, was pretty high on the strictness scale.
Whatever we call the right at stake in compulsory vaccination cases, its value
will almost certainly draw well-above-zero scrutiny. It will not be as if one is
insisting on a right not to be prevented from storing nuclear waste on one's
property.
So far, so easy. I excluded the very top niche and the very bottom niche of
constitutional value sites. As I said, prediction can be easy. Just don't be too
precise.
3. Penalties Versus Force: Which Government Action Does the Right Protect
Us Against?
To ask, "What is the right against?," is another way of asking what the right
78. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), doesn't establish otherwise. There, the Court, per
Justice Stevens, seemed to assign strict scrutiny to a claimed impairment of the right to travel.
"Neither mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review should be used to judge the
constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have
been domiciled in the State for less than a year. The appropriate standard may be more categorical
than that articulated in Shapiro [v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)], but it is surely no less strict."
Id. at 504. The source of law was the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Some version of the right to travel had already been recognized as fundamental, deriving (I'm not
clear how) from the equal protection clause. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). The
Court, however, did not clearly characterize the right as fundamental or as a liberty interest, though
it assigned strict scrutiny, suggesting a fundamental right was at stake. (There was a passing
reference to fundamental rights covered by Article IV's Privileges and Immunities clause, 526 U.S.
at 502 n.14.) Operationally, it's a fundamental right because of the strict standard used.
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is, and then one closes in on asking how much it is worth and what its associated
standard of review is. Rights talk propels cascades. It is well known that neither
Jacobson nor the law it applied authorizes vaccination by force. It authorizes
fines and imprisonment, not holding someone in a headlock while assailing their
bodies. This seems to be a pretty firm tradition, although I assume that some
persons have been vaccinated by force. 7 9
Suppose, however, we were inclined to endorse actual force in order to
maximize public safety. Consider the question, "What could possibly be so
wrong with forcing on you an only slightly painful needle stick that administers
an effective vaccine bearing no risks?" Then, you raise the point, "It's not a
matter of what you find right or wrong or even what some moral theory says is
right or wrong. It's my body, my mind, my identity, my person, and you cannot
mess with it directly at all; you can only provide incentives (comply or you pay
or get locked up)."
The force of the distinction between penalty and force is clear here: We, in
fact, do not force people to be stuck (or to swallow or be scratched). This is
because of the value that we assign to the integrity of one's person. No one has to
be vaccinated. To be sure, the penalties imposed may not be trivial, and one can
well argue that suffering steep fines (perhaps any fine) and imprisonment is a
serious breach of personhood, even if no one's physical person or mind is
directly intruded upon. (Most people probably would prefer getting vaccinated to
having to pay a thousand-dollar fine. Even the Rev. Jacobson seems to have
complied.) One might make a parallel point about extended exclusion of children
from school, given the critical importance of education.
It is not clear how much to make of the fact that we do not exercise force.
The physical loss and risk attributable to the act of force are, by hypothesis, low
to nonexistent. Yet we are inclined to admire those who refuse to sign loyalty
oaths or to bow to the regent, even though the action required is, in itself, trivial.
We do sanction arrests, shackles, and the death penalty. We have adopted a kind
of clumsy compromise in upholding physical compulsion of certain sorts and not
others, and physical compulsion in some but not all forms. But the fact that we
simply do not by law force vaccination is a telling point going to the strength of
the liberty interest, however described.
4. The Conceptual Interaction Between Threshold Rights and Countervailing
Interests
Despite the abstract distinction between saying that X is a right, but that
government can qualify it for reasons R, we often formulate the right (or no-
right) by partially absorbing into it the countervailing reasons against describing
79. 1 have not canvassed vaccination law and practice through time and region to see to what
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or valuing it in certain ways. Indeed, we may deny that there is a right or liberty
interest at all; we pack the government interest into the rights claim, and collapse
it into a no-right (or at least a weak one). This is in many ways politically and
even jurisprudentially efficient, if not entirely neat. We do not say that the right
to gratuitously inflict pain on others is qualified by the harm it causes. We simply
say there is no such right. We do the same with the right to injure ourselves in
some ways. True, we could say there is a presumptive right to do what we want,
qualified by harms imposed-the classic libertarian position. But we simply do
not talk this way in every case. We fragment human conduct into subsets, and,
within these differing domains, there are arenas in which the overwhelming
needs of society dictate a no-right (or even a who-would-ever-think-we-have-a-
right-to-X?) stance. We inquire into "the point" of the right, of the harms done to
others and to oneself, and say there is no right to mutilate oneself or others
(beyond tattooing and affixing nose rings).Who demonstrates for recognizing
such rights?
Let us apply this idea of interaction between rights and their countervails to
vaccination and, for comparison, to the prisoner in Washington v. Harper who
was administered Mellaril and other medicines over his objection.
5. What Exactly Is the Objection to Being Vaccinated?
The question here is not about the objection to being vaccinated over one's
objection. It is about the vaccination itself, even if presented as a voluntary
choice. Of course, one can question the moral propriety of forcing anyone to do
anything over her objection, even if the thing done bears no risks at all. As I said,
most exercises of fundamental rights do not have to be explained to others (not to
oneself either). If there is a serious right against compulsory vaccination, "I just
don't feel like it" is presumptively good enough. If your friends tell you they are
trying to procreate and you press for rational reasons for doing so, the friendships
may be impaired.
Still, one rightly wonders why a rational person would object to vaccination,
either generally or in particular situations, or object to it more than to other
medical procedures. Pressing this question makes a lot more sense than asking
why someone or some couple living in reasonably normal circumstances would
want children. Sometimes we need to ask what good are rights, right? We can
speak grandly about the integrity of body, mind, and identity, but how are they
even at stake with a (perhaps not-yet-existent) generation of drugs that are
maximally effective and minimally intrusive?
Is pain avoidance the reason for objecting? The risk of adverse effects?
Which adverse effects? If getting vaccinated makes the world look very purple
for three seconds, and this is it-no further effects, no permanent damage, no
80. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (1859).
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porphyrophobia involved-are there any rational grounds for refusal? Perhaps,
instead, the idea is that it is unnatural (not necessarily a religious objection) or
interferes with God's will? (Recall that we are not at the moment concerned with
the familiar idea that autonomous persons should not be forced to do anything,
risky or benign, on behalf of anyone else at all, ever, except for duties we incur
by having children or entering into contracts or statuses of certain sorts.)
The force of the question put to the vaccination objector is enhanced when
we recall a basic observation about human behavior: not every unsought
impingement on our persons is viewed as an incursion on our personal nature or
identity or an interference with the order of things. Sometimes we decline to
characterize something as an impingement on our integrity because it is just
totally unimportant. For example, although we do not like crowding, most of us
do not go to unusual lengths to arrange things so that no one ever brushes against
anyone else.
Turn now to Justice Harlan's impassioned call for limiting government
action where the right is explicitly invoked as sounding (at least in part) as harm-
avoidance:
It is easy, for instance, to suppose the case of an adult who is
embraced by the mere words of the act, but yet to subject whom
to vaccination in a particular condition of his health or body
would be cruel and inhuman in the last degree. We are not to be
understood as holding that the statute was intended to be applied
to such a case, or, if it was so intended, that the judiciary would
not be competent to interfere and protect the health and life of
the individual concerned . . . . Until otherwise informed by the
highest court of Massachusetts, we are not inclined to hold that
the statute establishes the absolute rule that an adult must be
vaccinated if it be apparent or can be shown with reasonable
certainty that he is not at the time a fit subject of vaccination, or
that vaccination, by reason of his then condition, would seriously
impair his health, or probably cause his death.8 '
What if the procedure is painless (a transdermal patch or small pill)?
Suppose the risks of adverse effects, whether of vaccination, or of Mellaril and
other medicines administered to Harper, were nil. To restate a familiar utilitarian
"paradox," assume that administering the medicine by force will save the world.
Surely a rational non-psychopath would accept the vaccination or medicine
(religious authority aside). Would forced administration shock the
conscience?82 It is not as shattering as, say, torturing a child to death to preserve
81. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38-39.
82. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that use of swallowed
morphine obtained by forcing an emetic into defendant's stomach through a tube violated the Due
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humanity. When there are no external risks, however, we can resist even modest
interference with our persons for no reason at all. But when there are risks, we do
say that some reasons for objecting are not good enough. In Jacobson, Justice
Harlan made a point of quoting the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
ruling on Rev. Jacobson's objection: "[W]hile they [the medical profession] have
recognized the possibility of injury to an individual from carelessness in the
performance of it [vaccination], or even, in a conceivable case, without
carelessness, they generally have considered the risk of such an injury too small
to be seriously weighed as against the benefits coming from the discreet and
proper use of the preventive. . . ."83
6. The Article's Shaky Start on Jacobson 2.1
A word on the matrix of criteria suggested by Professor Holland in her
account of what would have to be done in a Jacobson 2.1 situation. As noted,
they include "(1) public health necessity, (2) reasonable means, (3)
proportionality, (4) harm avoidance, and (5) fairness."84
Here, the theoretical question and the practical adjudicative advocacy
question coincide: What is this list supposed to do for us? Where do its elements
go in the argument structure of a vaccination case? The concepts listed are her
suggested criteria for assessing a rights claim against government assertions that
serious interests are being promoted. "Necessity," in its clumsy way, is about
both assessing the strength of the government interest in the situation at hand and
appraising the means. Although it bears significant (if highly competitive)
meanings, it is too opaque to be retained as a critical term in constitutional
analysis unless it is carefully specified, as when used as a tool for evaluating
mechanisms toward reaching a concededly significant objective. It reduces the
scope of "necessity" to prefix it with "public health," but does not add much to
its precision.
Moreover, it stands uneasily with "reasonable means." Is this concept mQant
to be a weaker standard than "necessary means"? A reasonable means criterion
goes into every non-minimal standard of review. (Recall that the minimal rational
basis test in substantive due process is not a true reasonableness requirement with
any teeth.) An even harder question-and more important for our purposes-
concerns the paired analytic operations a court should pursue in examining
government choice of means. The court must examine the efficiency of
mechanisms with respect to the identified goals, and it must also evaluate
whether, in light of the value of the goals, the mechanisms are constitutionally
adequate. Constitutional adequacy of means requires determining whether they
"sufficiently" advance the goal, considering its value, and do so without undue
83. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 721 (Mass. 1903).
84. Holland, supra note 5, at 46.
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(disproportionate?) intrusion on protected interests. The intensity with which the
courts perform these tasks varies with (among other things) the burden of
justification defined by the standard of review. What is "reasonable" (in either
the constitutional or everyday sense) may in some cases amount to a least
restrictive alternative requirement, while in others a looser "narrowing"
requirement may do for liberty interests not treated as major league fundamental
rights. What is the difference? There are differences in how hard a court (and the
legislature when it acts) looks for alternatives; in how the court addresses the
data (if any) and the inferences drawn from them; and so on. This is exactly the
sort of increasingly rigorous specification of review operations that courts will be
pushed to perform under the pressure of technological innovation, although such
pressures have always existed.8 5
Although it is hard to be certain about their meanings, the other elements of
the proposed matrix-proportionality, harm avoidance, and fairness-seem to be
miscategorized as independent aspects of analysis. Harm avoidance straddles
both the goal-evaluation dimension ("necessity") and the efficiency of the
mechanisms in moving toward the goal at relatively low cost (where "cost" refers
primarily, but not exclusively, to burdened constitutional interests). Althou h
"proportionality" is used (controversially) in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
the term is used differently here. This concept is often used in constitutional
adjudication outside the United States, but is occasionally mentioned here also. I
do not think that, as used so far, it significantly alters the content of what is
already contained within our doctrines, expressly or impliedly. Importing the
concept of proportionality is of questionable benefit, partly because it seems as if
it is doing some work. Proportionality concerns the comparative analysis
required identifying and evaluating goals, pitting them against interests impaired
by moving toward the goals, and examining the relative efficiency of the means
for so moving. Efficiency itself is value laden in any proportionality or balancing
process. For example, whether a given means advances a goal efficiently in a
constitutional sense depends in part on the value of the goal, which determines
the value of moving any given distance toward it. So proportionality covers at
least some forms of "balancing," as used in American constitutional
jurisprudence. However, there might be some theoretical and functional
differences between the two conceptual systems. For example, some
proportionality formulations might suggest standards of review more akin to a
continuous "sliding scale" than to a "step-function" with built-in tiers-i.e.,
thresholds that define where heightened scrutiny bursts onto the scene. Yet it
85. For an account of the narrow tailoring requirement and its limits, see Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 339-40 (2003).
86. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (ruling that execution of juveniles who
were under eighteen when their crimes were committed is disproportionate and thus violates the
Eighth Amendment).
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does not seem that this is the reason for its inclusion within the Article's matrix.
In any case, the claim that the "proportionality" argument structure is
extensionally equivalent to what we already have-either adding some contained
inference, or rhetorical flavor, or just cluttering things up-cannot be examined
extensively here. 8I simply note that Justice Breyer, rather obliquely, suggests
this equivalence. (How this might affect outcomes is not clear.)He said,
dissenting in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
Consequently § 505's restriction [on access by juveniles to
sexually oriented cable TV programming], viewed in light of the
proposed alternative, is proportionate to need. That is to say, it
restricts speech no more than necessary to further that
compelling need. Taken together these considerations lead to the
conclusion that § 505 is lawful.
So, I see little reason that the idea of proportionality adds to the
constitutional and policy analysis of vaccination. I stress that I am not saying it
has no incremental meaning-a point I turn to in Subsection III.E.6.The term
helps to understand the meanings of "balancing" by directing attention to some
aspects of use-and, in the other direction, the idea of balancing itself helps to
illuminate that of proportionality: they are entangled concepts.
Much the same applies to the overlapping idea of "fairness," which concerns
proportionality (among other things, such as justice, equality, and utility), which
in turn concerns evaluating the burdens imposed by the government's means in
light of the goals supposedly advanced. But this is what our standards of review
already do. Rendering these already-contained aspects of judicial review explicit
is not objectionable, but serious reconstruction of current doctrine is only
269 n.136. The differing structures may yield different results, although this is far from inevitable,
and often unlikely.
88. By "extensionally equivalent," I mean that the compared terms denote the same things but
have a different meaning (or sense or intension). Cf Ruth Barcan Marcus, Extensionality, OXFORD
REFERENCE ONLINE THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (2011), http://www.oxfordreference.
com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=tl 16.e851> (last visited July 29, 2011).
89. U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 846 (2000) (emphasis added) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer evidently thought that proportionality language was fully translatable-
at least in that context-into prevailing American terminology. The Court, however, ruled that a
cable TV regulation meant to shield children from sexually oriented programming failed the least
restrictive alternative standard. For more extensive comparative discussions of proportionality, see
Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U.
TORONTO L.J. 383, 386 (2007) (noting that the test, in the jurisdictions analyzed, "requires a
means-ends comparison"); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing And German
Proportionality: The Historical Origins, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 263, 265 (2010) ("One can, of course,
deny that balancing and proportionality are similar and argue that, despite superficial similarities,
they are analytically distinct. However, . . . we believe that the analytical differences between the
two concepts are not substantial enough to account for the differences in attitudes toward them.
Other, more promising explanations for the differences in attitudes between the U.S. and Europe
may be found in aspects of legal and political culture.").
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marginally advanced, if at all, by the Article's matrix. Although its elements bear
significant meaning, what was needed was a mapping of the sort tried here,
linking those terms to current constitutional doctrine, to see if they add anything.
If they do, it does not seem to be much.
IV. VACCINATION ANALYTICS: WHAT Do WE PLACE INTO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES?
Here, I apply the abstractions of the constitutional argument structures just
discussed to some of the specific aspects of the hepatitis B vaccine issue, and
vaccination issues generally.
A.Basic Questions About the Hepatitis B Vaccine Issue: Harms and Their
Causes
1. Factual and Conceptual Background
No case has been made against any form of hepatitis B vaccine in general,
nor as a condition of school attendance, nor as a routine accompaniment of birth.
I think Professor Holland has made a case for asking vaccinologists, allied
biomedical professionals, and public health experts to answer some specific
questions (e.g., whether the vaccine is thimerosal free), but her conclusion that
the vaccine has caused widespread harm to children is not scientifically
confirmed, and the anecdotes-in light of the research to date-are not
persuasive as clues that the dangers of vaccination are significant. True, anyone
is free to argue that science is not everything, and-here is an issue to pinpoint-
one may believe that parents and individuals generally should be free to decide
whether to allow personal invasions even if their objections have no scientific
warrant. If the right not to be vaccinated is a liberty interest, then I suppose the
claim is presumptively to be recognized-but it can be overcome under
heightened scrutiny.
Professor Holland's Article also calls attention to the fact that there are
90
varying degrees of need in different regions of the world. "Need," here, is a
90. Indeed, in some places, the vaccine program arguably should be broader-given at birth,
not just as a condition of school entry. See Koen Van Herck & Pierre Van Damme, Benefits of
Early Hepatitis B Immunization Programs for Newborns and Infants, 27 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS
DISEASE J. 861, 862 (2008) (stating that "In highly endemic countries, HBV is predominantly
transmitted among young children through perinatal or child-to-child transmission. It makes sense,
therefore, to vaccinate infants for early protection."). Even in the United States, infant vaccination
might be justified across the board. See id. at 862-64 ("An effective vaccination strategy must focus
on preventing HBV chronic carriage. Those infected at an early age are far more likely to become
chronic carriers. For example, in the United States, children younger than 5 years of age represent
only 1-3% of cases of acute HBV infections, but the risk of HBV infection to become chronic in
children younger than age 5 is 30-90%. As a result, 30-36% of cases of chronic HBV infection in
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function both of the incidence of infection and of the local health care system.
For example, an effective voluntary system that generates high compliance may
make compulsion unnecessary.
I do not see major issues about long-term efficacy. Most sources concur that
booster shots are not necessary for at least fifteen years in most cases. 91There is
little support in the biomedical community for any claims of serious vaccine-
caused complications, save for anaphylactic shock (about one-in-1.1 million).It
does seem confirmed, however, that there is a nontrivial incidence of some minor
adversities, all transient: fever, soreness, and a sense of discomfort or ill-being.
There is some support for the idea that some causal connection for some
adverse events in some vaccination subjects cannot be entirely excluded, unless a
causal link is simply inconsistent with well confirmed scientific findings about
how things work (findings that of course are themselves corrigible).The Article
should have highlighted this more clearly because it is at least consistent with its
skeptical stance on vaccination. As things stand, however, existing evidence does
not support a finding of any causal link between hepatitis B vaccine and any
serious disorders (very rare anaphylactic shock aside), including neurological
diseases such as multiple sclerosis. Science being what it is, one should assume a
window of possibility for showing otherwise, but this "revision space" is not, in
this case, a rational foundation for objecting to hepatitis B vaccination,
compelled or otherwise.
Recent attention has been given to the possibility that
vaccination with a hepatitis B vaccine increases the risk for
developing multiple sclerosis (MS). While we cannot say with
absolute certainly that the vaccine has never caused a case of
MS, some temporal associations are expected because hepatitis B
vaccine is administered to the same age groups where symptoms
of MS first occur. Since 1990, VAERS [Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System] has received 76 U.S. reports of MS following
vaccination with hepatitis B vaccine. These reports are spread
fairly evenly over the years. CDC has undertaken a further
prospective study of the possible association between
demyelinating disease (neurological diseases) and the hepatitis B
- 92
vaccine.
scale routine vaccination as early as in infancy to allow a maximum impact on reduction of HBV
transmission."). Targeting only those at high risk because of their behavior (drug use, sex) is
thought to allow too many victims to fall through the holes. "The main limitation of that selective
[high risk targeting] strategy was the fact that no risk factor for HBV infection can be identified in
over 30% of infected persons. Hence, a substantial proportion of HBV cases are missed by the 'at-
risk' vaccination strategy." Id. at 861.
91. See id. at 684 (It may be, however, that several administrations are required at the outset.).
92. See Susan S. Ellenberg, Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (last visited July 15, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucml 15058.
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So, "no causal relationship has been found" does not yield "there is no causal
relationship." 93 (Again, one would need to add premises about the inconsistency
of a causal hypothesis with confirmed scientific accounts.)
There are several distinct questions about how to respond rationally to a
scientific consensus-with-qualifications (no causal relationship established, but
not-a-cause is not confirmed either). One is whether it is rational to believe that
there is, in fact, a causal link between the vaccine and some serious adverse
events, other than anaphylaxis, even in the face of existing data. (Adverse events
caused in part because of certain contraindicating vulnerabilities are another
matter.) It's hard to see how it can be rigorously rational, despite the impact of
anecdotal reports, which certainly can have colossal impact, and indeed may
provide clues for further investigation. I am not sure that there is a consensus
htm (emphasis added). ("With virtually universal childhood immunization, beginning at birth or
shortly thereafter, any adverse medical event in a child will 'follow' vaccination, and some of these
will coincidentally follow within a few days of a vaccination. Thus, even if a vaccine is not the
cause of certain rare medical problems, it is a certainty that some number of these events will occur
within a short interval following a vaccination. For this reason, the fact that an event-even a very
serious event such as a death-occurs shortly after a vaccine has been administered cannot by itself
lead to the conclusion that the event was caused by the vaccine. . . . A determination that the
vaccine caused the post-vaccination event usually cannot be made on the basis of information
acquired from individual VAERS reports."); see also Mast, supra note 4, at 15 ("A causal
association has been established between receipt of hepatitis B vaccine and anaphylaxis. On the
basis of VSD data, the estimated incidence of anaphylaxis among children and adolescents who
received hepatitis B vaccine is one case per 1.1 million vaccine doses distributed (95% confidence
interval = 0.1-3.9). Early post licensure surveillance of adverse events suggested a possible
association between Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) and receipt of the first dose of plasma-derived
hepatitis B vaccine among U.S. adults (181). However, in a subsequent analysis of GBS cases
reported to CDC, FDA, and vaccine manufacturers, among an estimated 2.5 million adults who
received >1 dose of recombinant hepatitis B vaccine during 1986-1990, the rate of GBS that
occurred after hepatitis B vaccination did not exceed the background rate among unvaccinated
persons. An Institute of Medicine review concluded that evidence was insufficient to reject or
accept a causal association between GBS and hepatitis B vaccination. "(emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
93. Suppose the background incidence of some disorder is one per million persons (perhaps
limited some way according to certain traits, such as age or gender). Suppose also the incidence of
that disorder among every million persons given a particular vaccine is the same. No causal
pathway between the vaccine and the disorder is known, but no scientific knowledge excludes it.
No study finds a statistically significant result for a causal hypothesis-i.e., that the adverse event
is not the result of chance. Of course, even if a finding of causality were statistically significant,
this doesn't mean it couldn't have been the result of chance. Nor does failure of a result to be
statistically significant mean, standing alone, that there is in reality no causal relationship. Does this
entail that there can be no causal relationship between a given occurrence of the disorder and the
vaccine? No, but this isn't saying much, and it's certainly not saying that there is a good reason to
avoid the vaccine. What would it take to show causation? One would have to probe the possibility
of predisposing individual conditions that set up the rare individual for the adverse event.
94. See Alison M. Stuebe, Becoming a Physician: Level IV Evidence - Adverse Anecdote and
Clinical Practice, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 8, 8 (2011) (noting that adverse personal experience will
create compelling memories and can transform clinical practice). But there has to be more involved
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that there is in fact no causal connection (rather than "none shown") between the
hepatitis B vaccine and various adverse events cited by the vaccine's critics.
Even if there is, it could be the result of loose conflation of "no cause shown"
and "causation flatly excluded"; there are consensuses and consensuses.
Moreover, because of the contested nature of causation-cause-in-fact as
well as proximate cause-some causal attributions may be value laden, or linked
to one's personal preferences. Proximate cause is of course famous for its
normative ambiguity, but the supposedly factual notion of cause-in-fact might
also be, at least on occasion. 95
Another question about rational causal belief concerns what one ought to do
about these beliefs in various situations. Suppose everyone agrees that there is a
causal link between the vaccine and an extremely rare, very serious disorder
(how serious is of course critical). The obvious example is the accepted belief in
anaphylaxis. Should one avoid vaccination, for oneself or one's child, because of
this risk? Anaphylaxis can be fatal, especially if immediate medical help is
unavailable. Hepatitis B is a serious disorder, but not necessarily life
threatening. One can ask the same thing concerning, say, multiple sclerosis and
other serious neurological disorder: even conceding a causal link, is it rational to
avoid vaccination, given the seriousness of the disorder and the probability and
gravity of the described risk?
Here is another consideration. Suppose neither causation nor no-causation is
established. If causation is not empirically excluded, then it must be considered at
least possible. Assume that there are adverse event reports indicating a certain
incidence of occurrence of a serious adverse effect. Since it is, by hypothesis,
possible for there to be a causal link, is it rational to decline vaccination? (One
can then proceed as above.)
One can understand being leery of any medical procedure, including
vaccinations that are generally known to be safe, because of the expected
disutility (roughly, the product of an event's probability and its gravity). If the
risk of getting polio is one in a million and the risk of getting it from a
vaccination is one in a million, what is the point-within the individual's
decision framework-of taking it? From a collective standpoint, there may be an
epidemiological reason to vaccinate on a large scale-to maintain the low level
not be for the better.
95. See Taofikat Agbabiaka et al., Methods for Causality Assessment of Adverse Drug
Reactions: A Systematic Review, 31 DRUG SAFETY 21, 22 (2008) (discussing the abundance of
causal algorithms).
96. Hepatitis B is a liver disorder caused by viral infection. Hepatitis B, PUBMED HEALTH,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001324 (last reviewed Nov. 23, 2010) ("Early
symptoms may include: Appetite loss; Fatigue; Fever, low-grade; Muscle and joint aches; Nausea
and vomiting; Yellow skin and dark urine due to jaundice. People with chronic hepatitis may have
no symptoms, even though gradual liver damage may be occurring. Over time, some people may
develop symptoms of chronic liver damage and cirrhosis of the liver.").
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of polio infection, depending on the risks of resurgence of the disease.
But it is difficult to understand why any of the data presented in the Article
or its sources justifies a serious opposition to the hepatitis B vaccine. The author
principally cites writings that support her position, and one can raise questions
about the biomedical credentials of some of her principal sources.97 The strongest
material in her favor, presented by biomedical researchers, simply states that
causation cannot be excluded, and there is not much of it cited in her Article.
We are, thus, left with a value/preference issue, but one with a constitutional
dimension: Are we bound to leave such decisions about small but nonzero
degrees of risk to individuals because of the importance of their liberty interests
in the integrity of body, mind, and identity-of personal security in a
comprehensive sense?
2. Adverse Events, Study Findings, and Causation
"Adverse event" reporting is, of course, critical to assessing the safety of
medical mechanisms. Bare association of an adverse event with medical
treatments is scientifically relevant. But there is relevance and relevance. Relying
on such "anecdotal" information is a critical part of the scientific process and
cannot rationally be dismissed out of hand. To do so reflects a basic
misunderstanding of scientific research and advancement.
But such association generally cannot, at the start and standing alone,
establish causation. Bare reports of adverse events, however awful, cannot justify
opposition to a vaccination program, voluntary or otherwise, unless the scale of
the events indicates the strong possibility of causation. If one person out of five
hundred eating food from the same source suffers major digestive upset, there is
no cause for general alarm (although it may happen anyway). If several dozen get
sick, it is time to prosecute the food.
Moreover, the criteria for addressing whether linked events are causally
related are not settled. "Currently, there is no universally accepted method for
assessing causality of ADRs [(adverse drug reactions)]. No up-to-date review of
the existing causality assessment methods is available."98 Simply referring to
adverse event reports does not provide sufficient warrant for avoiding or
suspending vaccination, unless particular circumstances concerning scale and
indicia of causation are satisfied. It, thus, will not do to state, without far more
support than is offered, that "Since 2005, further scientific investigation has
suggested severe deleterious health consequences for many young children from
the hepatitis B vaccine. A 2008 study associates hepatitis B vaccination of male
97. See infra note 104.
98. See Agbabiaka et al., supra note 95, at 22 (2008). The article is an extensive literature
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newborns with autism diagnoses from 1997-2002."99
But, as the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) states:
VAERS data contains coincidental events and those truly caused
by vaccines. More than 10 million vaccines per year are given to
children less than 1 year old, usually between 2 and 6 months of
age. At this age, infants are at greatest risk for certain medical
adverse events, including high fevers, seizures, and sudden
infant death syndrome. Some infants will experience these
medical events shortly after a vaccination by coincidence. These
coincidences make it difficult to know whether a particular
adverse event resulted from a medical condition or from a
vaccination. Therefore, vaccine providers are encouraged to
report all adverse events following vaccination, whether or not
they believe the vaccination was the cause.loo
In any case, even if a confirmed percentage of adverse events is considered
caused by the vaccine, this is not sufficient to withhold support for the vaccine
program. It depends not only on incidence, but also on the seriousness of the
events, the seriousness of the disorder being prevented, whether the disorder is in
fact being prevented, and whether it is possible to stratify patients into high and
low vulnerability groups. A one hundred percent probability of a mild fever with
no adverse sequelae does not warrant suspending an otherwise justifiable
preventive program.
As for causation itself, what is needed to support Professor Holland's
reservations about hepatitis B vaccinations is an application of the various
methods and algorithms of causation analysis. There is no cited reference in her
Article that does this for hepatitis B, using any method of causation analysis.
There is nothing referred to that provides a basis for accepting any causal
hypotheses that adverse events-including multiple sclerosis-derive from the
hepatitis B vaccine, except (most seriously) for fever and (very rarely)
anaphylactic shock.' 0 '
99. Holland, supra note 5, at 74 (emphasis added.).
100. VAERS Data, VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING Sys., http://vaers.hhs.gov/datalindex
(last visited July I5, 2011).
101. See, e.g., Annemarie L. Broderick & Maureen M. Jonas, Hepatitis B In Children,23
SEMINARS LIVER DISEASE 59, 66 (2003) ("Hepatitis B vaccines have been shown to be safe for both
adults and children. Pain at the injection site (3 to 29 %) and a temperature greater than 37.70 C (I
to 6 %) have been the most frequently reported side effects, but these side effects were reported no
more frequently among vaccinees than among persons receiving a placebo. Anaphylaxis is the only
serious adverse event; this rare event occurs at a rate of approximately I per 600,000 vaccine doses.
[Editorial note: I cannot account for the variation in reported incidence.] Reports of multiple
sclerosis (MS) developing after HBV vaccination led to concern that the vaccine might cause MS
in previously healthy subjects. This was refuted in a nested control study of two large cohorts of
nurses in the United States. No association was found. In a case crossover study using the European
MS database, recent vaccination against HBV, tetanus, or influenza did not appear to increase the
127
41
Shapiro: Updating Constitutional Doctrine
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
If so, both the individual patient's decision and the overarching moral and
public policy issues concern the proper responses to conditions of uncertainty,
given personal and societal risk preference patterns. However, given the risks of
hepatitis B, the literature reports suggest that avoiding hepatitis B vaccinations
given present knowledge may not be entirely a matter of risk aversion patterns. I
note some possible alternative subtexts below.
The difficulties with marking out the nature of causation-whether we are
speaking of cause-in-fact, proximate cause, or related ideas-are well known.
Proximate cause, as suggested, is a standard example of normative ambiguity
because it embraces both the empirical links among events and policy judgments.
But even cause-in-fact has value components. We have to choose among
competing notions of causality, and, in some fields at least, there is no
overarching concept that unifies differing modes of analysis. The analysis of
adverse drug reactions is a clear example:
Numerous methods for causality assessment of adverse drug
reactions . . . have been published. The aim of this review is to
provide an overview of these methods and discuss their strengths
and weaknesses. . . . We conducted electronic searches in
MEDLINE (via PubMed), EMBASE and the Cochrane databases
to find all assessment methods. Thirty-four different methods
were found, falling into three broad categories: expert
judgement/global [sic] introspection, algorithms and
probabilistic methods (Bayesian approaches). . . . As a result of
problems of reproducibility and validity, no single method is
universally accepted. Different causality categories are adopted
in each method, and the categories are assessed using different
criteria. Because assessment methods are also not entirely devoid
of individual judgements [sic], inter-rater reliability can be low.
In conclusion, there is still no method universally accepted for
causality assessment of ADRs.102
It is hard to see how American courts pursuing heightened scrutiny can do
short-term risk of relapse in MS. Vaccines were commonly prepared with thimerosal, sodium
ethylmercuricthiosalicylate, to prevent bacterial and fungal contamination. This preservative has
aroused great public concern regarding mercury toxicity. Infants were considered at greater risk for
mercury poisoning from thimerosal-containing vaccines. No adverse outcomes have been clearly
associated with thimerosal use; nevertheless, in 1999, a joint statement was issued by the AAP, the
American Academy of Family Physicians, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices,
and the U.S. Public Health Service. These four bodies called for the national goal of removal of
thimerosal from vaccines and the performance of studies to establish any relationship between
thimerosal exposure and health effects. HBV vaccination in newborns was temporarily suspended
in 1999 until thimerosal-free vaccines became available, unless the mother was infected with HBV.
There are now two thimerosal-free HBV vaccines available in the United States for use in infants.
Hence, parents can be reassured about the lack of exposure to mercury in HBV vaccines.").
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more than inquire into the views of persons credentialed in empirical analysis
(assuming credentials can even be agreed upon) and screen for conflicts of
interest and other factors that may compromise adequate neutrality. This sort of
inquiry would seem required by heightened scrutiny, but it obviously must
operate within resource, knowledge, and ability constraints that limit judicial
inquiry and decision.10 3
These difficulties are not extensively addressed in the Article, and there
seems to be excessive reliance on the reporting of adverse events, simpliciter, as
well as reliance on certain sources whose background and training are not
directly in vaccine or epidemiological research, although they may have
practiced medicine or acquired expertise in statistics.104 There are no grounds for
completely dismissing what they say, even though they have not yet made a case
for "equal time." Credentials (training and experience, at the least) are hardly
perfect proxies for sound opinions, never mind accurate results. But they are not
nothing, and non-experts-including courts-have to pay serious attention to
them. It is easy to say that one should avoid over-reliance on expert judgment,
but it is hard to say just what counts as "over-reliance."Even if experts are often
wrong, it is not clear what the threshold alternative is to according some authority
to their views and to await better grounded informed opinion. The best that the
laity can do is to inquire about rational foundations for judgment, including the
investigation of conflicts of interest that are widely accessible outside of the
experts' domain. This is especially important in light of the almost inevitable
normative dimensions of expert conclusions. "These girders are strong enough"
is not a simple factual judgment," any more than is "This vaccine is quite safe."
Experts are wrong often. See Aristotle, Ptolemy, and the opponents of
Semmelweis, Marshall, and Warren, and, more recently, Dan Shechtman, the
winner of the 2011 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, who was expelled from his
research group for "disgracing" it with his work on quasicrystals. os His results
were considered "impossible." But the errors of experts are generally established
by other experts running scientific studies and experiments, not simply reporting
sequences of salient events!
103. See infra notes 175, 193.
104. Michael Belkin describes himself as a statistician. Geoff Metcalf, Vaccines That Kill
Children? Geoff Metcalf Interviews Mandated-Immunization Opponent Michael Belkin,
WORLDNETDAILY.COM (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.whale.to/m/belkinl.html. Dr. F. Edward
Yazbak, M.D., is described as having practiced pediatrics for many decades. Dr. F. Edward
Yazbak, MD, HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.com/physician/dr-f-edward-yazbak-32ff3/
(last visited July 24, 2011).
105. Interview with Dan Shechtman, Distinguished Professor of Materials Science at
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B. What If We Concede Causation?
I raised this possibility in the preceding section and add a few points.
Completeness requires that we indulge such assumptions arguendo. The point of
the question is this: Even where causality is conceded (or credibly posited), the
risks, as understood so far, are extremely low. The risk of causing anaphylactic
shock is about one-in- 1.1 million, as noted.106 Suppose one also accepts, as some
do, that hepatitis B vaccine may cause serious autoimmune disorders in a group
(fairly small) of susceptible subjects. What policy outcome? What constitutional
rationale and outcome when someone refuses compelled vaccination and is fined
or imprisoned? 0 7 Apply these questions to the points made by Geier and Geier:
One would have to consider that there is [a] causal relationship
between HBV and serious autoimmune disorders among certain
susceptible vaccine recipients in a defined temporal period
following immunization. In immunizing adults, the patient, with
the help of their physician, should make an informed consent
decision as to whether to be immunized or not, weighing the
small risks of the adverse effects of HBV with the risk of
exposure to deadly hepatitis B virus.los
But what exactly are they saying has been found? The "causal relationship"
is not (necessarily) between the vaccine and the adverse event, but between
circumstances of administration of the vaccine and the results. Part or all of the
problem may be that the "inactive" substances included in the vaccination
package are risky, e.g., thimerosal, a preservative (which has been significantly
phased out). 109 Geier et al. state:
106. See supra note 4.
107. See the discussion of possible constitutional argument structures for a latter-day
Jacobson, infra Section III.E.
108. Mark R. Geier & David A. Geier, A Case-Series of Adverse Events, Positive Re-
Challenge of Symptoms, and Events in Identical Twins Following Hepatitis B Vaccination:
Analysis of The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting Systen (VAERS) Database and Literature
Review, 22 CLINICAL EXPERIMENTAL RHEUMATOLOGY 749 (2004); see also Arnon Dov Cohen &
Yehuda Shoenfeld, Vaccine-Induced Autoinmmunity, 9 J. AUTOlMMUNITY 699, 701 (1996) ("The
data summarized here suggest that some vaccines may in rare cases induce autoimmune disorders.
The subject of the vaccine-autoimmunity relationship is still obscure; reports have been rare, no
laboratory experimentation on this topic has been undertaken, and there are few animal models. For
the time being no conclusions can be drawn. Since vaccines are an important prophylactic
intervention, the risk-benefit ratio clearly leans towards the advantages of infectious disease
prevention. Vaccination routines should not be changed in the healthy population or for patients
with known autoimmune disorders.").
109. See Broderick & Jonas, supra note 101. This does not mean there is no contaminant
danger. See Katherine Hobson, Charred Shrink Wrap in Merck Vaccines: Read the FDA Inspection
Reports, WALL ST. J.: HEALTH BLOG, July 29, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2011/07/29/
charred-shrink-wrap-in-merck-vaccines-read-the-fda-inspection-reports. Recall that some deny that
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Hepatitis B is one of the most important infectious causes of
acute and chronic liver disease both in the US and worldwide. In
order to combat the life-threatening effects of hepatitis B
infection, recombinant hepatitis B vaccines have been
developed. The medical and scientific communities have
generally accepted that recombinant hepatitis B vaccine-a
highly purified, genetically engineered, single antigen vaccine-
is a safe vaccine. Information is presented showing that hepatitis
B vaccine contains yeast, aluminium, thimerosal and hepatitis B
surface antigen epitopes, which may result in hepatitis B vaccine
being associated with autoimmune diseases among susceptible
adult vaccine recipients. There is little doubt that the benefits of
this vaccine overall far outweigh its risks. to
Very young children are in no position to provide informed consent, to be
sure, so their parents must make the choice. But I think that in the case of
hepatitis B, this does not alter the conclusion that vaccination risks may be
imposed within the legislature's discretion, even when heightened scrutiny is
imposed. For other vaccination programs, the result may be different.
C. Efficacy, Safety, and Need
"I need this "ambiguously embeds matters of fact, value, and personal
preference. There is a lot of information about hepatitis B carrier rates and the
incidence of infection, but some disagreement about its significance. In the
United States, we are rarely overwhelmed by epidemics, but we are far from
home free: the smallpox-is-dead story is only about smallpox. Nevertheless, a
pressing question concerns what levels of safety and prevention are morally and
constitutionally "enough" to sustain compelled vaccination in various situations,
conceding a certain set of facts. Here is a pinpoint illustration: Suppose one says
(Professor Holland does not do so directly) "onlyn persons will be protected from
X through this vaccination program."This formulation is significantly begging
the question, and its circularity does not seem universally recognized. It is
circular because the "only" presupposes an unstated value premise: it is just not
worth other costs and risks to prevent ("merely") n persons from getting X. This
is sometimes put in a remarkably blunt way: "[V]accinating over 100,000
children annually to ideally avoid 200 acute cases per year (mainly in drug
addicts) is not considered logical from a public health standpoint [in
Sweden]."I11
This sort of buried premise on what is worth doing to save lives and preserve
I 10. Mark R. Geieret al., A Review of Hepatitis B Vaccination, 2 EXPERT OPINION ON DRUG
SAFETY 113 (2003) (emphasis added).
111. Sten Iwarson, Why the Scandinavian Countries Have Not Implemented Universal
Vaccination Against Hepatitis B, 16 VACCINE S56 (1998).
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health requires ventilation-certainly far more than appears in some of the cited
literature. 1 It is a plain moral and logical truth that, for all n, where n is any
number, n lacks independent moral significance, whatever its import in number
theory.)
How, then, should we characterize the degree of success or failure of the
hepatitis B vaccine? To be sure, claims of "success" may be as normatively
ambiguoas and possibly question begging as claims of failure and uselessness,
but the following account seems reasonably neutral. It suggests, among other
things, some issues in causal attribution, noting that behavioral changes among
adults-not children-may explain some of the decline in the incidence of the
disease.
In the United States of America, the impact of hepatitis
Bimmunisation has been impressive. From 1990 to 2001, the
overall incidence of acute hepatitis B declined by 66%, from8. 1
to 2.8 cases per 100,000. The decline was most dramatic among
children 0-11 years old, with an 89% decline, from 1.1 to 0.12
per 100,000. Among adults, the reasons for the decline in
incidence include vaccination, as well as safer sex and injection
practices. However, among children the decline in incidence can
be attributed to vaccination, which has been routinely
recommended for all infants sincel991." 3
On the other hand, the hepatitis B situation is not such a big deal, right?
In 1996, fifty-four cases were reported to the Center for Disease
Control in the birth-to-1 age group. There were 3.9 million
babies born that year so the incidence of hepatitis B is 0.001%.
[0.00138%] Does that sound like enough cases to warrant a
vaccine?90 to 95% of all hepatitis B cases recover completely
after 3 to 4 weeks of nausea, fatigue, headache, arthritis, jaundice
and tender liver. Approximately 50% of patients who contract
Hepatitis B develop no symptoms after exposure. However, the
exposure ensures that they will have life-time immunity. 114
112. Id. at S56-S57. No effort was made to unpack any material premises to demonstrate the
conclusion.
113. David FitzSimons et al., Long-Term Efficacy of Hepatitis B Vaccine, Booster Policy, and
Impact of Hepatitis B Virus Mutants, 23 VACCINE 4158, 4163 (2005). See also Broderick & Jonas,
supra note 101, at 60 ("Although HBV infection is not highly endemic in the United States, similar
effects have been noted. Due to both immunization strategies and changes in risk behaviors, the
annual incidence of HBV infection has declined from about 200,000 cases to 79,000 over the last
decade or so. From 1986 to 2000, the rate of acute hepatitis B among children I to 9 years of age
declined more than 80%.").
114. Hepatitis B, VACCINE TRUTH, http://www.vaccinetruth.org/pagel I.htm (last visited July
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If numbers can be morally freighted and the moral weight of these particular
numbers is known, then one can just see that the recommended vaccination
program is unwarranted, right? Would the number would have to be, say, 762?
Fifty-four babies with these symptoms is not worth it?115
The opposing side, which soft-pedals adversities rather than life-protection,
is occasionally no better formulated. According to the Centers for Disease
Control:
Severe problems are extremely rare. Severe allergic reactions are
believed to occur about once in 1.1 million doses. A vaccine, like
any medicine, could cause a serious reaction. But the risk of a
vaccine causing serious harm, or death, is extremely small. More
than 100 million people have gotten hepatitis B vaccine in the
United States.116
On these figures, there were over ninety severe allergic reactions. This is not
enough either. Is 762 the right number when adversities are played down?
It is sometimes denied that the vaccination program even serves to reduce
the incidence of hepatitis B, although it is hard to distinguish these claims from
"it doesn't reduce it (enough)" and "the program wasn't administered very well
so it failed." The weight of authority, however, is that the programs have
significantly reduced the incidence of hepatitis B-although there are no magic
moral numbers here either-and some emphasize factors other than the vaccine
to account for the low incidence of the infection. 17
One might argue that the highest risk behaviors-drug use and sex-are
simply not pursued by the younger school age children. There are some ready
responses to this. First, even if few of the younger children pursue illicit conduct,
those few should be protected, particularly since they are generally judged to be
below the age of fully responsible behavior. In any case, getting hepatitis B is
115. Note that vaccinating babies is a way of reducing the risks of contracting hepatitis B in
later childhood or in adulthood. See Mast, supra note 4. See also Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee Prevention of
Perinatal Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus: Prenatal Screening of all Pregnant Women for
Hepatitis B Surface Antigen, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 341 (1988) available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000036.htm.
116. Hepatitis B Vaccine: What You Need To Know, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/vis/downloads/vis-hep-b.pdf (last visited July 18,
2011).
117. See F. Edward Yazbak, The Hepatitis B Vaccine: What Went Wrong?, VACCINATIONS
NEWS, available at http://www.vaccinationnews.com/node/19957 (last visited July 15, 2011). But
see R. S. Koff, Review Article: Vaccination And Viral Hepatitis - Current Status And Future
Prospects, 26 ALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS, 1285, 1289 (2007)("By 2005, a
98% decline in HBV infection was reported for children 13 years of age of younger since 1990 and
a 97% decline among adolescents aged 12-19 years, a result of the national programme of child-
hood immunization. The decline in hepatitis B among adults was less striking at 76%. Sexual
transmission and injection drug use remained important risk factors in this group.").
133
47
Shapiro: Updating Constitutional Doctrine
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
disproportionate to whatever responsibility they bear. Second, there is a risk of
horizontal transmission from students-including older students-who do
contract hepatitis B, from whatever source. Third, once acute, a patient is at
significant risk for developing chronic hepatitis B, which, though treatable,
remains a serious condition.
In pursuing her questions about whether the hepatitis B vaccine is, in fact
and in value, needed, Professor Holland invokes the experience of some
Scandinavian countries having a low incidence of hepatitis B.11 9 In Denmark, for
example:
The report concluded that the effect of introducing hepatitis B
vaccine into the childhood vaccination programme would begin
to manifest itself in 15-20 years. After 40-50 years the
immunisation programme would save an estimated 10 lives per
year as a result of fewer cases of chronic liver disease. In the
short term, a universal vaccination programme would mean that
targeted vaccination children [sic] in daycare centres where there
are children with chronic hepatitis B would be unnecessary, and
children in the daycare centres with chronic hepatitis B would
run a smaller risk of stigmatisation. The net costs would be
substantial if hepatitis B was to be implemented as a stand alone
vaccine. On the basis of the conclusions from the medical
technology assessment report, the National Board of Health has
recommended that hepatitis B is not introduced into the
childhood vaccination programme, and has instead suggested
optimising the current risk group vaccination strategy [....]20
Some points to consider: First, the carrier rate of hepatitis B surface antigen
A is higher in the United States than in Denmark. This may suggest a stronger
need for a given vaccination program. The Danish experience may be instructive,
but is not decisive for the United States. Second, why is saving ten lives over a
half century not worth the effort-or is that not what was meant in the Danish
report and in the Cowan article? What is the effort? Does the conclusion
presuppose that we are to assess the program via a simple cost-benefit analysis, in
118. Broderick & Jonas, supra note 101, at 61 ("Children not infected at birth remain at risk
from infected household and community contacts, especially in subpopulations in which HBV
infection is prevalent. This is called horizontal transmission. The exact mechanisms are unknown,
but transmission by shared toiletry items, such as toothbrushes, and even by activities such as
sharing chewing gum has been postulated. Transmission by sexual contact and shared injection
drug equipment represents risk factors for adolescents as well as adults.") Also, "Infants who
acquire HBV perinatally have up to 90% risk of developing chronic HBV infection." Id. at 59.
119. Holland, supra note 5, at 72.
120. Susan A Cowan, Denmark Decides Not To Introduce Hepatitis B into the Childhood
Vaccination Programme, 10 EUROSURVEILLANCE 2827 (2005).This article also stressed that much




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 12 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol12/iss1/3
HOLLAND RESPONSE AND EXPANSION
which harms and benefits are monetized? If so, this presupposition requires a
fuller articulation and defense. To some extent, public policy operates within a
cost-benefit framework, but often it does not, at least in the usual senses of that
concept. Most parents do not cost out the expected value of a child when
deciding to use all their resources to fund an organ transplant. Third, the Danish
policy was not based on the probability and gravity of adverse effects, but on cost
per life saved.121 This is not a sufficiently complete way of assessing a policy's
advantages and disadvantages. Fourth, hepatitis B vaccine policies do not pretend
to be pitched on saving enormous numbers of lives that would be snuffed out by
liver disease. It does save lives, but for each death, there are many more cases of
illness and dysfunctionality; no one aspires to contract this disorder. Assessing
the number of deaths prevented is focusing on a relevant variable, but far from
the only one; morbidity is a central issue in formulating a rational hepatitis B
policy.
Moving north in Scandinavia, Sweden's policy, as described in an article
(somewhat dated) cited by Professor Holland, states:
Northern and Western Europe are low-prevalence areas for
hepatitis B, with HBsAg [hepatitis B surface antigen, indicating
infection] 22 carriage rates below 0.05%. [Some regions are at
20%.] Even among low-prevalence areas, however, great
differences are seen. In Scandinavia, carrier rates are
approximately 0.05% as compared with France, for instance,
which has a carrier rate of approximately 0.5%.[The U.S. carrier
rate is reported in at least one source to be 0.27%.]l23 .... The
limited spread of the hepatitis B virus in Scandinavia can be
demonstrated by the low number of officially reported acute
hepatitis B cases occurring annually in Sweden. Despite the low
number of reported acute cases of hepatitis B, a substantial
number of Sweden's immigrant population is HbsAg positive.
These carriers, however, do not seem to have a major impact on
the number of acute hepatitis B cases in Sweden. Over the past
ten years increasing numbers of immigrants have entered the
country, but acute cases of hepatitis B continue to be seen mainly
among drug addicts and their contacts and to a certain extent,
among male homosexuals with multiple partners.
Countries in Scandinavia have chosen not to introduce universal
infant immunization against hepatitis B because the problem is
12 1. Id.
122.See Mast, supra note 4.
123. Annemarie Wasley et al., The Prevalence Of Hepatitis B Virus Infection in the United
States in the Era of Vaccination, 202 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 192 (2010). ("During the period
1999-2006, age-adjusted prevalences of anti-HBc (4.7%) and HBsAg (0.27%) were not statistically
different from what they were during 1988-1994 (5.4% and 0.38%, respectively).").
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considered to be a very limited one. In the case of Sweden,
vaccinating over 100,000 children annually to avoid 200 acute
cases per year (mainly in drug addicts) is not considered logicalfrom a public health standpoint. I24
Without specifying other premises, including certain assumptions about
what social preferences are in place, there is nothing "illogical" or irrational
about vaccinating one hundred thousand children to prevent two hundred cases of
a serious disorder-at least until we know what the criteria of "illogicality" are in
this context. Which moral metric tells us that it is not worth it to do X to get Y?
Comparison of the monetary valuation of bodily intrusions to lives and health?
Which opportunity costs (the costs of foregone benefits) are at stake? If the
Swedish approach to the logic (or illogic) of public health is part of the
foundation for working out a rational American vaccination policy, this should be
disclosed and explained more clearly. Cost-benefit analytics may be powerful
tools of public policy, but, as they are usually pursued, such metrics are not
always decisive-neither in fact or as a matter of value analysis. 125Why, for
example, do we have an orphan disease research policy in the United States? If a
dollar spent on disease X would save one life and a dollar spend on disease Y
would save one hundred lives ... the drill here is obvious. Perhaps the policy is
ill-considered, but we have it, and it is partly based on close assessments of the
126
seriousness, as well as the incidence, of the disorder. Consideration of
opportunity costs looms large here.
To be sure, to say that in some cases we do not use cost-benefit analysis is
not to deny that we consider advantages and disadvantages. The former process
is often a more particularized and quantified version of the process of comparing
advantages and disadvantages. 127This cluster of issues concerning the moral
aspects of harm and benefit analysis seem insufficiently addressed in any of the
accounts about Scandinavian practice cited in Professor Holland's Article or this
Reply. This is not made up for in other ways in the Article.
Moreover, there is a rather obvious subtext, although I make no claims about
124. Iwarson, supra note 111, at S56-S57 (emphasis added).
125. See generally Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, in
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 93 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997).
126. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.).
127. Even this general remark may be controversial. Definitions of "cost benefit analysis" are
varied. For example: "The quantification of the total social costs and benefits of a policy or a
project, usually in money terms." John Black et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis, OXFORD REFERENCE
ONLINE, http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t I 9.e6 11
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011). This formulation is consistent both with a quantification-only approach
and a more general comparison of advantages and disadvantages. The latter formulation, however,
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what motivates public policy in Scandinavia or anywhere else. The quoted article
emphasizes the role of immigrants, gay persons, and addicts in maintaining the
incidence hepatitis B. Its reference to "vaccinating over 100,000 children
annually to avoid 200 acute cases per year (mainly in drug addicts)" (emphasis
added) offers a rather pointed suggestion about values that affect vaccination
policy. One might add that some children do grow up to be drug addicts, so why
protect them from the inevitable? (I am not at all ascribing this view to Professor
Holland.)
The hepatitis B literature does contain some indirect critiques of the
Scandinavian policy.
Although the proportion of young children infected by HBV in
countries with low endemicity is small, this population largely
contributes to HIBV morbidity and transmission because of more
frequent progression to chronic carriage when HBV is contracted
early in childhood. Therefore, only newborn/infant universal
vaccination could lead to efficient prevention of chronic carrier
state and finally elimination of the disease. Of particular
importance for countries with low endemicity is the element of
HBV import through migration of HBV chronic carriers born in
regions with high HBV endemicity, subsequently spreading
HBV infection. As population movements increase, for example
mobility into Europe, control of infectious diseases needs to be
supported by appropriate strategies, such as infant immunization
programs.
Of course, the need for a particular vaccination program rests on the efficacy
of the vaccination as well as the gravity and epidemiology of the disease. (It also
rests on the adequacy of the administrative set up of the program.) The scientific
sources indicate fairly clearly the substantial effectiveness and a long period
during which boosters are not required; no one claims perfection.129
Finally, here is a note on thimerosal. This is vaccine preservative containing
mercury, and it is being phased out of use. Whatever harms it causes are not
intrinsic to hepatitis B vaccine. Whether it causes harms is contested, but I do not
think that the studies suggesting risk can be ignored. 1301 note particularly the
128. Van Herck& Van Damme, supra note 90, at 865-866.
129. See supra note 91; see also Fitz Simons et al., supra note 113, at 4159 ("Each new study
extends the known duration of efficacy of hepatitis B immunisation; several published reports
document long-term efficacy lasting for 15 years and other studies will probably push this figure up
to 20 years and longer."). The vaccine, however, is not one hundred percent effective. See, e.g.,
Chuanfang Lee et al., Research Effect of Hepatitis B Immunisation in Newborn Infants of Mothers
Positive for Hepatitis B Surface Antigen: Systematic Review And Meta-Analysis, 332 BRIT. MED. J.
328, 335 (2006) ("Repeated vaccination over months is required to mount an effective antibody
response.").
130. Carolyn Gallagher & Melody Goodman, Hepatitis B Triple Series Vaccine and
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quoted remarks by Geier, Geier & Zahalsky, attributing some autoimmune
adversities to thimerosal additives in hepatitis B vaccines.
For future reference, here are other matters to consider: Suppose the law
(federal or non-preempted state law, if any) prohibited the use of a vaccine, and
that the enactment was based solely or primarily on adverse event reports and
some rare but serious harms concededly caused by the vaccine itself. What then?
Could the hepatitis B vaccine properly be banned? Although important, I will not
discuss such issues here, except to say that for every right-against-X, one could
(in theory) mount a right-to-X claim.
D. Education and Vaccination:A Note on the "Punishment" of Children and
Piggybacking Public Health Measures onto Government Functions
Although the Article's title stresses vaccination of pre-school children, there
is an implicit criticism of the use of compulsory schooling programs as a hook to
latch onto children in order to vaccinate them. Professor Holland, for example,
notes critically, that "[s]ome commentators reject the view that there must be a
close nexus between school and vaccination to warrant a state mandate."' 3 ' The
result of this improper piggybacking is thought to work an injustice to the child
excluded for lack of a required vaccination. Professor Holland states:
"Punishments include loss of education, social isolation, parents' loss of
custodial rights, child neglect sanctions against parents, and even forced
vaccination."' 32 Here, the term "punishment" is tendentiously pejorative-a weak
Developmental Disability in US Children Aged 1-9 Years, 90 TOxICOLOGICAL & ENVTL.
CHEMISTRY 997, 997 (2008) ("This study found statistically significant evidence to suggest that
boys in United States who were vaccinated with the triple series Hepatitis B vaccine, during the
time period in which vaccines were manufactured with thimerosal, were more susceptible to
developmental disability than were unvaccinated boys."). Different forms of mercury compound
may pose different risks. In any case, the Public Health Service in 1999 urged manufacturers to
reduce or eliminate the preservative, and "[m]uch progress has been made to date in removing or
reducing thimerosal in vaccines. New pediatric formulations of hepatitis B vaccines have been
licensed by the FDA, Recombivax-HB (Merck, thimerosal free) in August 1999 and Engerix-B
(Glaxo SmithKline, thimerosal free) in January 2007." Thimerosal in Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/VaccineSafetyUCM
096228#tox (last updated Mar. 31, 201 0).But note that not all researchers concur on the thimerosal
risk. See Osman David Mansoor & Peter Salama, Should Hepatitis B Vaccine Be Used for Infants?,
6 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 29 (2007) ("Concerns have been raised regarding the mercury
preservative in vaccines leading to potential toxicity. But the evidence to date does not support any
association of hepatitis B vaccine with serious adverse consequences. Protecting infants through
immunization is the most effective control strategy. By 2005, over 80% of countries had
implemented routine infant immunization. In countries with relatively low rates of hepatitis B virus
infection, some have argued to defer immunization until later life. However, these arguments focus
on the more visible acute infection. The possible future cost from a single infant infection argues
for universal infant hepatitis B immunization-given the very high costs of treating its
consequences (e.g., liver transplant) and the very low price of the vaccine." (emphasis added)).
131. Holland, supra note 5, at 51.
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rhetorical device complaining about school exclusion; the fact that it is a
disadvantage not to be schooled does not render it a "punishment," and the
exclusion, if adequately justified, is preferable under the circumstances to
inclusion. The so-called punishment is a mechanism to protect the student's
health and educational potential.
Although the argument is not explicit, the embedded view that schools
should not be used as a device to implement vaccination requires some comment.
One cannot assess the situation by focusing on any given student. The
vaccination system is workable only in the large. 33 What is needed, then, is
attention to the possible consequences of not having a vaccination program: there
will be more students unable to study because of illness, however contracted. It is
possible, of course, that a given school vaccination program is not justified. A
smallpox vaccination program would not now be in order. But the lack of
justification for any given program cannot rest on the considerations presented in
this passage. The social isolation is not for nothing. As for more drastic
measures, such as sanctions for neglect-there is not just one tray in the scale.
This view that compulsory school attendance programs can be used to
further goals other than education is common, although one could not properly
argue that schools are a kind of medium into which anything can be poured.(The
goal-e.g., preventing sickness-is not always "other than education": it is hard
to educate sick students.)But we have long used schools for more than standard
educational purposes. (Don't ask me to list the purposes-many are sharply
contested. For example, we also rely on schools to develop professional cadres of
athletes and soldiers: think athletic teams, ROTC, and the armed services
academies.) There is nothing illogical, contradictory, or otherwise irrational
about this in general. Using the educational system as a device to insure at least
one good meal a day for students is controversial and not well implemented, but
it does not necessarily contradict educational goals, and may promote them. This
is why education is (at least) a two-way deal: the supposedly peripheral
objectives (promoting student health and well-being via vaccination, food
133. As to this last point, which contrasts the individual rationality and collective rationality
frameworks, see James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 876-877 (2002). ("[P]erceptions differ
sharply depending on whether the risk of vaccination is viewed from an individualistic or societal
perspective. From the perspective of a single child, there may be greater risk if she is vaccinated
than if she remains unvaccinated. For example, during the past two decades, the only cases of polio
reported in the United States are caused by the vaccine; an unvaccinated child's risk of contracting
wild polio virus is very small. State-imposed vaccination should be understood in this light. The
state is explicitly asking parents to forego their right to decide the welfare of their children not
necessarily for the child's benefit but for the wider public good. From a societal perspective, the
choice not to immunize may be optimal to the individual if there is herd immunity, but in the
aggregate, this choice could lead to failure of that herd immunity. Affording individuals the right of
informed consent to vaccination, then, may not be for the greatest good of the community. Rather,
informed consent can contribute to a 'tragedy of the commons' if too many people make the
decision not to immunize.").
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programs, etc.) not only enhance education, but may make it possible in the first
place for some students. The Article's objections implicate serious disputes
between competing political philosophies. From some of those moral and
political vantage points, it is wrong for the state to displace parental or private
responsibility generally.134 Some of these objections are also informed by a more
general opposition to paternalism in various forms, although the subject is not
directly addressed in the Article. But these premises are not fully articulated or
defended.
Piggybacking vaccination and other public health measures onto the
educational system is meant to serve several overlapping (and usually
nonconflicting) purposes: to further educational goals, to protect the children
themselves (this includes both unvaccinated and vaccinated children-immunity
is rarely complete), 3 5 and to promote public health generally. Using the school
is simply one way to get at certain members of the public--children-who
happen to be in particular places at particular times, thus ameliorating a serious
logistical problem. There is no inherent policy or constitutional problem with
this. Vaccinating the entire population outside any independent programs that
gathers them together in groups would be hugely inefficient and possibly
ineffective. As a byproduct rather than a primary goal, such programs may also
reinforce notions of community responsibility by selective overriding of personal
autonomy in certain matters. On the other hand, they may also erode the lofty
normative status of autonomy. Impairing autonomy (in one way) in order to
promote it (in another way) is a two-edged blade, bearing mixed social learning
messages. Much depends on the conditions of public perception and debate. To
be sure, public health is furthered by measures not linked to schools, and has
improved significantly for reasons not limited to successful vaccination
programs. But this does not damage the case for compulsory school vaccination.
Leaving aside the religious issues (which I do not cover here), does the
combinatorial aspect of these functions-education and public health-raise
federal constitutional issues? I denied this earlier. A standard form of individual
rights claim is that the right is impaired and heightened scrutiny triggered when
certain conditions are imposed on their exercise.
For example, suppose "The State of Anomie hereby establishes the Agency
for Promoting Safety in Extreme Sports. No one who has ever had an abortion or
performed, assisted, procured, aided, abetted, or encouraged an abortion need
apply." I assume for the sake of argument that there is no fundamental right or
liberty interest in a particular job, trade or profession (leave aside procedural due
134. For example, Jesse Helms, ANSWERS.coM, http://www.answers.com/topic/jesse-helms
(last visited July 18, 2011) ("He believed it was the role of the private individual to help others, as
he and his wife, Dorothy Helms, had done by adopting a nine-year-old orphan with cerebral palsy.
In Congress he voted against federal aid to disabled people and against school lunch programs.").
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process issues) or even in having a job. But canceling a job prospect as a sanction
for having or performing an abortion is clearly an undue burden on a woman's
rights under Casey. Similarly, if delivering a speech in a public forum is a
fundamental right (subject to reasonable time, place and manner rules), it cannot
be conditioned on paying prohibitive fees in advance.136
One might, then, argue that the interest in attending school is compromised
by requiring vaccination. This will not work for various reasons. For better or
worse, there is no fundamental right to education as such.137 Moreover, if there is
no independent constitutional infirmity in compelled vaccination, then
conditioning school admittance on compliance is not itself unconstitutional.
E. Jacobson 2.1 Applied: the Pinpoint Issues
1. Some Assumptions
We are now in a position to work on some related reconstructions of
Jacobson. I try to make the questions relatively precise, but the varying doctrinal
possibilities and sharply different social situations make this difficult.
I start with a brief but instructive (if hard to penetrate) remark about
comparing medical and epidemiological situations in different places:
"Mandatory immunization may not be needed or appropriate for all societies,
particularly those with health care systems that cover the entire population and
,138stress prevention."
There is of course some irony here. Many vaccination opponents are inspired
by the same autonomy concerns that stir opposition to government-regulated
health care systems, but it is precisely the latter systems in which there seems to
be a lesser need for compulsory vaccination because most persons get vaccinated,
more or less voluntarily, through the existing health care establishment. 139
136. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
137. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Viemeister v. White, 72
N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904) (decided under the New York constitution and cited in Jacobson).
138. Walter A. Orenstein & Alan R. Hinman, The Immunization System in the United States-
The Role OfSchool Immunization Laws, 17 VACCINE S1 9, S23 (1999).
139. Gail Horlick et al., Delivering New Vaccines to Adolescents: The Role of School-Entry
Laws, 121 PEDIATRICS S79, S81 (2008) ("Many countries around the world rely on other factors
rather than law to increase vaccination coverage. For example, the United Kingdom relies on the
individual's sense of responsibility to society to seek vaccination. However, comparisons between
the United States and other countries have been complicated by differences in cultural context;
what works in one society may not work in another. The United States has a historical tradition of
individualism and freedom from government influence. Also, immunization programs in the United
States and the United Kingdom differ in some key respects, which may impact implementation of
new vaccines; for example, in the United Kingdom, vaccines are available at no charge." (footnotes
omitted)); see also Cowan, supra note 120 ("In the Scandinavian countries, as well as in the
Netherlands and the UK, Universal childhood vaccination has not been implemented because the
incidence of the infection in the general population is very low."). It is not clear whether the low
incidence is the result of the health care system, other factors, or some combination of these causes.
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Most argument structures in constitutional law are not so rigid that major
differences in situation cannot yield different outcomes. Suppose the hepatitis B
situation in Scandinavian nations or the United Kingdom prevailed in the United
States. This is, of course, a quite heroic supposition, because the "situation" in
the United States might include sharp differences in social and legal values as
well as in disease demographics. In any event, the American constitutional
argument framework would still be applied to this limited Scandinavia-to-
America social and medical transplant, but it might play out very differently. For
example, the analysis of tradition might, on the one hand, reveal lesser concern
for individuality across wide swaths of behavior, but greater concern in discrete
fields such as vaccination. Europe, considered by many to be a lesser bastion of
rigorous individuality than America, arguably has, in some locales, a greater
tradition of voluntariness in vaccination. Traditions, depending on how
described, differ from region to region.
But this is getting a bit ahead of the game. Assume that the U.S. Supreme
Court says that a right to refuse vaccination is a serious liberty interest that
instantiates an overarching right to personal security. Assume also that this right
comprehends the integrity of body, mind and identity, but draws mid-level
scrutiny.
There are many ways to pursue and describe the next series of analytic steps,
and I avoid further comment on whether "balancing," "proportionality" and
"fairness" are (in this context) extensionally equivalent. We would proceed
roughly as the Supreme Court did in working out the logic of liberty interests in
Cruzan, Romeo, Casey, Harper, and Lawrence. All these cases, rightly
mentioned by Professor Holland, involved some form of "liberty of the
person,"' 40 so designated, and drew on nontrivial standards of review (not always
designated), all derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. So we can discuss these cases as a doctrinal set and use them to
analyze the constitutional properties of compulsory vaccination.
To overcome the presumption favoring a person's exercise of a given right
against vaccination, the government can offer the justifications of promoting the
health of children, adults, and society, and of reinforcing certain communitarian
norms. In turn, such value reinforcement may feed back into promoting right
actions and good results. (Normative systems are not simply dangling
The author states: "During the past 10 years, the number of notified cases infected through injecting
drug use (IDU) has declined. It is not known if this decline is due to vaccination among IDUs or to
the success of needle exchange programmes. Although heterosexual transmission has remained
low, it is now the leading route of infection. . . . Prevalence studies in Denmark over the past 20
years have shown a decline in the prevalence of HBsAg carriers from 0.15 % to 0.03 % in the
indigenous population. During the same period there has been a considerable influx of people from
high endemic countries. Studies of HBsAg prevalence in immigrants to Denmark in 1998 and 2002
have demonstrated a prevalence of 0.6% among children and 2.6% among pregnant women." Id.
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abstractions; they inform and often govern behavior in massive ways.)
This is not the place to write an entire hypothetical opinion, so I jump to the
nub of the next stage of analysis. Here are the primary points that drive the
constitutional argument in this not-so-imaginary Jacobson 2.1:
First, vaccinations work for hepatitis B and many other disorders, but they
are not perfectly effective.
Second, vaccination is not a walk in the park: they all pose a risk of adverse
effects, from trivial (quite common) to fatal (extremely rare).
Third, the scientific literature supports a causal connection between
vaccination and adverse effects only for a small proportion of all the adverse
effects that have occurred "within the curtilage" (or res gestae?) of vaccination.
It takes far more than the bare occurrence of an adverse effect to establish
causation.
Fourth, for most adverse events, the research can support a strong finding of
"no causal link shown within accepted templates for causal analysis, therefore no
rational reason to believe it for any given case."
Fifth, unless well-confirmed science forecloses a causal association, a "no
cause shown" conclusion does not yield "causation is excluded; there is not and
cannot be any causal link." If in fact some vaccination caused a single case of
autism because of a one-in-billion vulnerability, no research study yet designed
would be able to discern this (absent specific scientific causal path
discoveries). 141Although it would be an interesting exercise to imagine a clinical
study capable of confirming such causation, I leave this to quantitative
empiricists.
Sixth, many persons do not have a realistic understanding of the meaning of
probability and assign greater danger or disvalue to highly improbable outcomes
than is warranted. This seems to be consistent with general human
predispositions toward certain forms of cognitive error (some of which may be
"wired in" through evolutionary adaptation).142
Seventh, the impact of specific events (even when reported anecdotally)-
especially when in one's face-can be enormous. This has advantages (it
rationally spurs investigation) and disadvantages (we are prone to make causal
attribution errors).143
Eighth, the pressing need for social protection for any given disorder varies
141. There is apparently some evidence that preexisting autism is a predisposing factor for
adverse vaccine reactions. Maria Dorota Majewska et al., Age-Dependent Lower or Higher Levels
of Hair Mercury in Autistic Children than in Healthy Controls, 70 ACTANEUROBIOLLAE
EXPERIMENTS (Pol.) 196 (2010). So far, the only example of serious caused adversity for hepatitis B
vaccine seems to be anaphylactic shock, but here, biomedical specialists need to be consulted; I
haven't run across anything else shown.
142. See generally 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 763 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th
ed., 2010).
143. See supra note 94 and accompanying text
143
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over time and place. The conditions that drive smallpox and polio are now totally
different: there is no smallpox. Yet, although the incidence of polio is low
(though variable), polio could re-emerge at any time if vaccination programs are
144
not continued.
2. The Vaccination-Resister's Claims
So, here I stand, the resister: I'm risk averse, and very risk averse
when it comes to my kids. I say where there's smoke, there's
fire. I'm also more averse to what might be immediate
(vaccination injury) rather than remote and unlikely (getting
hepatitis B). You tell me that my reasoning is skewed, that I am
overawed by mere salience, and I tell you that the exercise of
important rights does not rest on the rationality of my decision,
and anyway I don't think it's irrational. Rationality is
normatively ambiguous. If I am unwilling to take a one in a
million chance of anaphylactic shock (scientifically confirmed),
it's my right to refuse, either for myself or my child. I think that
"no cause shown between X and Y" doesn't mean "it has been
shown that X doesn't cause Y," and that the bare possibility (not
refuted) that the vaccine causes autism or MS is enough to
justify refusing the vaccination. Still more, I don't care if there is
some social benefit: I am not a mere means to an end and don't
want to be injected with or forced to otherwise ingest something
I don't want in my body, possibly impinging on my mind. In
constitutional terms, here are my pinpoint claims ("pinpoint"
compared to other formulations):
I invoke my liberty interest (including parental liberty interest in
child raising) 4 5 to follow my preference to avoid risk. I concede
that I am overawed by anecdote, but hey, that's me, and I know
that I'm right, and Kahneman & Tverskyl 4 6 and their ilk are
rightly ignorable. Yes, I am aware that my personal security and
dignity interests and those of my family can be compared with
and weighed against social interests, but those interests don't
outweigh my claim. Why should I take a chance of fatal
144. Horlick et al., supra note 139, at S79; see supra note 139.
145. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (200) (recognizing a liberty interest in making
decisions about the care, custody and control of one's children) (plurality opinion). As mentioned ,
the Court obviously used a form of heightened scrutiny, but did not say where it fell within the
available range of standards. Somewhat confusingly, the Court spoke both of liberty interests and
fundamental rights, referring to the "fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of
her two daughters."Id. at 68.
146. I'm referring here to the now vast literature on human proneness to cognitive error.
See,e.g., RICHARD NISBET- & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980);Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
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anaphylactic shock in order to prevent a disease that is generally
nonfatal and treatable, and, in the United States, has an incidence
far lower than what prevails in high endemic areas.
For that matter, why should I take a very high risk that I or my
child will suffer even mild, transient fever and malaise under
these non-urgent conditions?
And just in case you think, foolishly, that the risk of adverse
effects is functionally zero (Who gets hit with the one-in-million
catastrophe? Barely one in a million!), I say this: I invoke my
liberty interest to maintain the integrity of my person whether
there is danger or not. Even if the medical risk is zero, even if
there is no psychological apprehension on anyone's part (and
even if they experience positive pleasure from the needle stick), I
don't want my body invaded by anything I don't want in me,
whether this preference is idiotic or not. If I'm competent, I'm
free to be irrational in that way, assuming it's irrational, which it
isn't. (Don't ask me why it makes a difference whether I'm
competent if I'm free to be as irrational as I want when
competent.)
Yes, I understand that although the risk to me or mine may be
zero, asserting my rights entails that certain risks are run by
others (although I don't think those risk are that serious). Why
are their preferences to be preferred to mine when mine are
directly and immediately under threat? Maybe others will come
down with something. But it's certain I'll get stuck or have to
pay for it if I continue to refuse. Where rights are at stake, you
can't just count up and compare utiles and declare that I don't
have enough of them. As Nozick said, "Individuals have rights,
and there are things no person or group may do to them (without
violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights
that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its
officials may do."' So I don't owe nothin' to nobody-at least
most of the time. I concede that if there is an overwhelming risk
of really bad things going down-like one of those alien
infections that perennially afflict The Enterprise and really mess
everyone up-that forcing me to comply would be both morally
and constitutionally justifiable. But that's not true with hepatitis
B. Whether it's true for any disease going around, I don't have to
say.
Finally, I don't even believe a lot of the claims about vaccine
safety, efficacy, disease incidence, and disease treatment. The
147. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA IX (1974).
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people making these claims are operating under a conflict of
interest: they want money. So, in many senses, I have a
"divergent risk perception[]," and a "different [and
nondelusional!] perception of reality" 148compared to the
mainstream.
One more thing. You can't put a definitional stop on me by
saying that my choices are stupid or insufficiently reflective and
therefore violate some definitional rationality constraint on
autonomy, and so I and my choices are not autonomous.14 9 I
don't see autonomy that way, but I'm not just claiming an
autonomy right (bearing possible conceptual limitations)-I'm
claiming a liberty right. I say I'm perfectly rational, but I don't
have to make sense to you. Even if my decisions don't satisfy
your (restricted) notions of "autonomous choice," they are within
my constitutional liberty interests.
As a general matter, this set of claims is too broad to be sustained within
current doctrine, although I would guess there is no shortage of persons who
would support them. Buthow are courts to address this array of entangled
empirical and value questions (including value questions associated with both
risk and uncertainty) under any given standard of review?
3. How Far To Go Within a Standard of Review
a. In General: Craig v. Boren
I start with an example that is far afield in subject matter, but not in
constitutional relevance. In Craig v. Boren,151 the Court invalidated a law that
prohibited sales of 3.2% beer to males under age 21, but allowed sales to females
18 or over. Persons from 18 through 20 were thus treated differently because of
their gender. Craig was the first case formally to apply intermediate scrutiny to
gender-based classifications.152 The standard was that "classifications by gender
148. Lotte Asveld, Mass- Vaccination Programmes and the Value of Respect for Autonomy, 22
BIOETHICs 245, 253 (2008).
149. Id. at 248("Internal autonomy or positive freedom as such involves reflection on one's
actions, the outcome of which effectively determines those actions. When one acts on a whim, this
is not an autonomous action."). There seems to be a normative/conceptual rationality plank to
autonomy, but the point may go too far.
150. "Risk" refers to measurable probabilities of defined harms, and "uncertainty" applies
when we cannot calculate the probabilities (and possibly when we cannot even tell if an outcome
would be a harm or a benefit). See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at
ix (Signalman Publishing 2009) (1921).
151. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating gender-based age requirements for
purchasing 3.2% beer).
152. Craig was preceded by (for example), Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which applied
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must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."l 53
What was the point of the government's gender classification? Was it to put
down adolescent males and glorify the traditional image of female innocence?
The main rationale-not well explained by Oklahoma-was to save lives and
protect against injury to persons and property. The bare outline of the state's
reasoning was simple-and clumsy: ingesting alcohol leads to driver impairment,
which leads to more vehicle crashes, which in turn leads to more injuries and
damages, which leads to more deaths. Preventing death and injury seem
compelling, not just important, to invoke a freighted term from strict scrutiny.
In using its review standard, the Court did not second-guess the legislature's
implicit view of the moral value of saving life or ask when life might properly be
sacrificed for the greater good. As Justice Powell said in his concurrence, "No
one questions the legitimacy or importance of the asserted governmental
objective: the promotion of highway safety. The decision of the case turns on
whether the state legislature, by the classification it has chosen, had adopted a
means that bears a "fair and substantial relation" to this objective."154
Of course, the Court was not confronted by some clear and present risk of
death, whether to specific persons or "statistical" ones. Still, death and injury
were at stake. Yet the Court did not stress the prospect of death and injury despite
the obvious accident risks. It glossed over the government's probable purpose,
focusing instead on reviewing the "legislative facts":
We accept for purposes of discussion the District Court's
identification of the objective underlying [the law at issue] as the
enhancement of traffic safety. Clearly, the protection of public
health and safety represents an important function of state and
local governments. However, appellees' statistics in our view
cannot support the conclusion that the gender-based distinction
closely serves to achieve that objective and therefore the
distinction cannot under Reed withstand equal protection
challenge. 55
The Court attacked the means chosen to implement this goal-a gender
classification based on taking arrests as gender-differentiated proxies for
of decedents' estates. The Court described its task as determining whether a gender classification
"bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced." Id. at 76.
153. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
154. Id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 200 (majority opinion). The Court found the issue of actual purpose to be slippery,
and such problems may arise more pointedly in other cases. By "legislative facts," I mean the
general empirical findings that (supposedly) underlie a legislative action. See Kenneth L. Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 75 S. CT. REv.75 (1960) (defining and distinguishing
the overlapping categories of legislative and adjudicative facts).
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dangerousness. The Court attacked the very quality of the data presenting these
comparative arrest records. It was that the arrest count itself was thought to be
wrong (although it could have been); it was that biases might have affected the
very decision to arrest one person as opposed to another, based on gender. The
differing arrest rates of males and females might have been partly attributable to
such biases. Thus, inferences about comparative dangerousness drawn from the
differential arrest of boys and girls are likely to have been flawed. On this view,
we cannot view the higher arrest rate for males as signaling that they are, as
drivers, more dangerous than females. Of course, not everyone who drives under
the influence is arrested, so the arrest rates may understate whatever danger there
is, but this does not affect the overall analysis on either side. As Justice Brennan
put it (in a footnote, oddly enough, considering the importance of the point):
"The very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws... are
likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics. Hence
'reckless' young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest statistics,
whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home."1
56
How did Justice Brennan know this? Of course, he did not. He, in effect,
judicially noticed the omnipresence of male (and police) stereotyping of gender
behaviors and implicitly argued: "This stereotype-induced distortion is so likely
that we must consider its constitutional impact-and when we do, we see that the
arrest data are tainted and unreliable. Without assurance that the arrest criteria in
operation were sound, the data are an uncertain basis for inferences about much
of anything." As a matter of constitutional analysis, one might well compare
Justice Brennan's critique with the conflict-of-interest "financial distortion"
attack on medical/vaccination claims made by pharmaceutical companies and
allied health care practitioners.157 (I am not necessarily endorsing either one as a
winning constitutional argument or even as sound policy.)
The Court displaced not only the legislature's presentation of the facts of
drunk driving arrest differentials, but its valuation of the significance of its
"findings":
Viewed in terms of the correlation between sex and the actual
activity that Oklahoma seeks to regulate-driving while under
the influence of alcohol-the statistics broadly establish that
.18% of females and 2% of males in that age group were arrested
for that offense. While such a disparity is not trivial in a
statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment of a
gender line as a classifying device. Certainly if maleness is to
serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2%
must be considered an unduly tenuous "fit." Indeed, prior cases
have consistently rejected the use of sex as a decision-making
156. Craig,429 U.S. at 202 n.14.
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factor even though the statutes in question certainly rested on far
more predictive empirical relationships than this.1s
Justice Brennan grudgingly conceded that the "disparity is not trivial in a
statistical sense." Indeed, it's an order of magnitude difference, as noted by then-
Justice Rehnquist.159But that concession was of no moment: Justice Brennan's
attitude was, in effect, 'order-of-magnitude, shmorder-of-magnitude: both figures
are too low to justify impairing gender-equality interests.' The risks and losses
are acceptable in light of the need to reinforce the gender equality norm. This
"acceptable losses" stance is one major crux of the vaccination dispute: at several
points, the Article suggests, by way of recounting Scandinavian practices, that
compulsory hepatitis B vaccinations simply are not worth it as far as lives saved
are concerned.
For our purposes, Justice Brennan's key phrase is this: "Certainly if
maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must
be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit."'61
Consider the premises embedded within Justice Brennan's dismissive
statement. Note first what he is not saying. The claim that two percent of males
are arrested over a given period is obviously not a claim that that specific group
of males is, over a given period, involved in fatal or otherwise serious accidents.
If that were the showing, and we could also show that females never caused
accidents, the constitutional argument should play out quite differently.
Moreover, the claim is not even that two percent represents an accident rate, with
or without injury or damage. It is just arrests that are taken as an index for other
rates: accidents, injuries, deaths, and property damage. What is the evidence for
the link between drinking (of some sort, in some amount, with some measured
158. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-02.
159. Id. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. See supra notes 111-112.and accompanying text.
161. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-02 & n.14; Justice Powell offered a similar observation,
particularly stressing the lack of a ban on possession. Id. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring)("It seems
to me that the statistics offered by appellees and relied upon by the District Court do tend generally
to support the view that young men drive more, possibly are inclined to drink more, and for various
reasons are involved in more accidents than young women. Even so, I am not persuaded that these
facts and the inferences fairly drawn from them justify this classification based on a three-year age
differential between the sexes, and especially one that it so easily circumvented as to be virtually
meaningless. Putting it differently, this gender-based classification does not bear a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."). Justice Stevens also entered the fray,
complaining of the "slight benefit" of Oklahoma's classification. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)("The legislation imposes a restraint on 100% of the males in the class allegedly
because about 2% of them have probably violated one or more laws relating to the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. It is unlikely that this law will have a significant deterrent effect either on that
2% or on the law-abiding 98%. But even assuming some such slight benefit, it does not seem to me
that an insult to all of the young men of the State can be justified by visiting the sins of the 2% on
the 98%."). Why, exactly, isn't burdening ninety-eight percent for the sins of the two percent
justified if (some of) those sins have fatal or other serious effects?
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physiological impact) and road accidents? There are reams of material on the
impairment worked by alcoholic intoxication and the consequences of driving
under the influence. Let us assume that this scientific showing is sound: drunk
driving increases the risk and actual incidence of road wrecks. (However, this is
not to concede that drinking 3.2% beer in particular has any effect on accident
rates. Justice Brennan, in fact, cast doubt on this.) 162
But suppose the data show a very high probability that implementing the
classification will prevent some deaths or severely disabling injuries, but no more
than a few. Compare this to: "Administering one million doses of vaccine V will
prevent only twenty deaths." How is this an "only"?l 63 If we prevent just one
death or crippling injury, isn't it worth it?-even if life is not a pearl beyond
price? If that were what had been starkly presented in the record, and a striking
gender differential had been soundly shown, what would we say-as citizens,
legislators-and constitutional judges?
Of course, it was not starkly presented in the record, and, as we saw, the
Court did not go out of its way to point out that averting death and injury was the
dominating goal. Of course, it did indicate that even if it were the goal, the
legislature picked a very poor way to promote it. Nevertheless, whatever one
might say about the legislature's inept effort to reduce harm by restricting only
one gender's activities instead of everyone's, Craig is still about the death of
girls and boys and men and women as much as it is about gender discrimination.
What costs and irritants are we willing to endure to save a life?
b. Judicial Review of Valuing Lives
We are attracted to questions like this in the way we are attracted to the
sight-and site-of disasters. How many lives need to be saved to justify
interfering with a basic right? How would we weigh art murder against people
murder? ("I will destroy the Mona Lisa unless you kill a child as a sacrifice to
me.") Isn't the ten-to-one ratio for how many criminals are to be let go to protect
an innocent person seriously skewed? This is way too many innocents convicted.
Even one in a 100 or one thousand is too many. (Or is it way too many guilty
persons let go?) Why is it permissible (even for God) to save as few as ten good
people, but not fewer? And why did Abraham stop at ten, in trying to save
Sodom and Gomorrah?1 64Why not just one? Why does even a single innocent
162. Id. at 203 (majority opinion) ("None purports to measure the use and dangerousness of
3.2% beer as opposed to alcohol generally, a detail that is of particular importance since, in light of
its low alcohol level, Oklahoma apparently considers the 3.2% beverage to be 'nonintoxicating."')
(citing OKLA. STAT., tit. 37, § 163.1 (1958)).
163. Cf Mary F. McNaughton-Collins & Michael J. Barry, Perspective: One Man at a Time
- Resolving the PSA Controversy, NEw ENG. J. MED. (2011) (asking "who is to decide what
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resident have to die because of the evil of his neighbors? Remember the Trolley
Problem (saving five by switching the tracks, thus targeting one victim) and the
Fat Man problem (pushing the man onto the tracks to save five)? And the
problem of deciding who gets the last kidney or dialysis machine? What about
letting the violinist directly attached to your kidney die in order to vindicate a
major, but temporary, intrusion on your personal integrity? 65 Suppose that we
know that media presentations about suicide cause a small number of persons to
kill themselves who otherwise would not, or causes them to do so earlier, thus
reducing rescue opportunities. It is pretty clear that neither a statutory or
administrative ban nor an injunction or damages are permissible under current
constitutional doctrine. Why not? One death is not compelling enough? (Of
course, it is "only" a statistical death.) 166Are causal lines too thin-too many
intervening causes-so that legal restrictions on speech cannot be considered
necessary to promote the government's interests? Are less restrictive alternatives
available so that necessity is again not satisfied? 67
One of Justice Rehnquist's complaints about the majority opinion in Craig
highlights the problem of judicial review of valuing life. He said:
[T]he present equal protection challenge to this gender-based
discrimination poses only the question whether the incidence of
drunk driving among young men is sufficiently greater than
among young women to justify differential treatment.
Notwithstanding the Court's critique of the statistical evidence,
that evidence suggests clear differences between the drinking
and driving habits of young men and women. Those differences
are grounds enough for the State reasonably to conclude that
young males pose by far the greater drunk-driving hazard, both
in terms of sheer numbers and in terms of hazard on a per-driver
basis. The gender-based difference in treatment in this case is
therefore not irrational.168
Again, there is no direct question of the form, "Is the interest in avoiding
gender classification so strong that we cannot prevent the x deaths attributable to
165. WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of
Abortion, I PHIL. & PUBLIC AFF. 47 (1971); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Turning the Trolley, 36 PHIL. &
PUBLIC AFF. 359 (2008).
166. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITF, TRAGIC CHOICES 38-41, 137-41 (1978)
(discussing the gains from saving known lives at the cost of losing a greater number of unknown
lives).
167. See McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 (Cal.App. 3d. 1988), where parents sued rock
musician Ozzy Osbourne and other parties because their son committed suicide after hearing music
extolling it. The appellate court held that no cause of action had been made out for incitement or for
intentional or negligent invasion of the parents' rights. The court did not discuss the use of a clear
and present danger standard as an alternative to the incitement theory.
168. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 226 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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males being more dangerous than females"? But the suggestion is that, in this
context at least, the Court should not displace the legislative judgment. (True,
Justice Rehnquist applied a standard of review different from the majority's: the
rational basis test, rather than intermediate scrutiny.) 69
Justice Rehnquist's point might be reformulated this way. We ask why the
interest in avoiding gender classification in this case is so monolithically
important, and why so little attention is paid to lifesavin where an order of
magnitude difference in gender performance is claimed? 1 7 Lifesaving is really
important. Recall the claim that "[t]he possible future cost from a single infant
infection argues for universal infant hepatitis B immunization-given the very
high costs of treating its consequences (e.g., liver transplant) and the very low
price of the vaccine."l71 Moreover, the more important the interest, the weaker
should be the least-restrictive-alternative burden (a rigorous efficiency standard).
There should be some functional relationship between degrees of importance and
the search for better alternatives so that government is less burdened when it is
trying to vindicate a massively important interest. Constitutional doctrine does
not quite read in this finely calibrated way, but if there are degrees of
compellingness and importance (there must be), there are degrees of weakening
of the narrowing requirement for means-end connections, within standards of
review and between them.
To be sure, Oklahoma cast doubt on the seriousness of its lifesaving
rationale by banning sales only, not possession or consumption. One could well
say that it offends important constitutional interests, whether about liberty or
avoiding adverse classifications, to impair them with such ineffective
mechanisms when much more effective ones were available (such as barring all
drinking from eighteen through twenty years of age). But the showings were not
that thin. Justice Powell, concurring, sided more with Justice Rehnquist than with
the majority when he said that that state's data supported the claim that young
men drive and drink and get into more accidents than young women. One wants
to say, to the majority, "Well...?"l72
169. Craig,429 U.S. at 220. Intermediate scrutiny was put down as having "come[] out of thin
air." Id.
170. The issue has to be carefully framed. Justice Rehnquist raised a basic issue of why the
legislature couldn't conclude that certain risks were indeed sufficient to justify intruding on
constitutional interests, but he did not describe the interest in the most accurate way: "The personal
interest harmed here is very minor-the present legislation implicates only the right to purchase
3.2% beer . . . . "Id. at 226-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This is incomplete. The interest also
concerns the reasons for rights limitation-for interfering with personal autonomy- and the
reason in this case was gender and what was thought to be linked to it.
171. See Mansoor & Salama, supra note 130.
172. Justice Powell's concurring conclusion is thus unsettling, even if ultimately correct
because the legislature didn't ban consumption, thus casting great doubt on both the very point and
the effectiveness of its gender classification. But he made a lot of telling concessions, usefully
applied to the vaccination context. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 ("It seems to me that the statistics offered
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c. Narrowing
A final comment on "narrowing"-the search for lower-cost alternatives to
the chosen legislative means. This is not some questionable doctrinal artifact: the
requirement is a basic rationality constraint, although its form and rigor vary
significantly across contexts. If there is another way to accomplish more or less
the same thing at a lower cost in rights impairment, then the chosen maneuver is
constitutionally questionable. To travel efficiently from San Francisco to Los
Angeles, one does not normally take the Polar route. This constraint is, by
definition, supposed to be weakened when applying less than strict scrutiny-the
alternatives probably do not have to be equally effective, the costs imposed do
not have to be the lowest possible, the legislature does not have to look as hard
for them, and the courts do not have to second-guess the underlying empirical
data as rigorously.
One could argue, for example, that with hepatitis B, the most efficient-least
restrictive-alternative is simply to target those engaged in the highest risk
behaviors: drug use and unsafe sexual practices. Of course, this would be less
effective in reducing hepatitis B because not all cases are caused by these ill-
famed risky behaviors. But some observers have also suggested that where such
high-risk targeting has been attempted, it has not worked well.173 I have not
pursued this issue, but it seems of marginal relevance to the protection of
children.
These, then, are the sorts of constitutional adjudication issues raised with
increasing frequency by technological innovations, old and new, as well as by the
increasing (or simply better noticed) complexity of things generally. Think again
of Craig and how the Justices managed their bout with intermediate scrutiny.
Justice Powell highlighted the issue of how the Court should delve into empirical
data and inferences by referring to "the facts and the inferences fairly drawn from
them."174(He might also have asked how the Court was to approach legislative
conclusions of value, but having accepted the legislative description and
valuation of its goal, it was not at issue.)In the vaccination context, how should
the Court apply Justice Powell's advice? For example, how is the Court to
address the data and evidence collection process? Compare investigating the
comparative incidence of arrests with determining the incidence of a
men drive more, possibly are inclined to drink more, and for various reasons are involved in more
accidents than young women. Even so, I am not persuaded that these facts and the inferences fairly
drawn from them justify this classification based on a three-year age differential between the sexes,
and especially one that it so easily circumvented as to be virtually meaningless. Putting it
differently, this gender-based classification does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation.").
173. "It has become evident that HBV transmission cannot be prevented with a strategy for
vaccinating only the groups considered at highest risk." Broderick & Jonas, supra note 101, at 65.
174. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 (Powell, J., concurring).
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communicable disease.
Compare next the inferential processes in Craig with those in cases asserting
a right against compelled vaccination. On promoting traffic safety: If males and
females are arrested at different rates, does this reflect differing degrees of
"gender-risk"? With respect to reducing disease, does the local epidemiological
situation indicate that the infection rate is about to increase sharply?
Finally, examine the legislative valuations. Is the level of traffic risk enough
to justify the gender classification? (Compare this question with that of
separating race-based gangs in prisons to reduce violence.)Does saving the lives
or promoting the health and functionality of fifty people justify a million
vaccinations (compulsory? voluntary?) that bear risks Y and Z with probabilities
Py and Pz?Is there some constitutionally legitimate way for a Court to address
stark legislative valuation problems without simply punting-deferring
completely to the legislature?
This account, to be sure, barely scratches the surface in outlining material
questions about how courts are to use a standard of review. 175 (And in pursuing
this, one can push the comparison between Craig and vaccination cases too
far.)Still, it is instructive to ask if we really know the incidence of hepatitis B
carrier status (any more than we know the actual incidence of male and female
drunk driving). How many cases would be avoided with a given vaccination
program? How many lives would be saved? Can the vaccine-induced fever
threaten long-term damage? How effective are the treatments for hepatitis B? Do
the likeliest victims in fact have access to treatment? (Vaccination programs are
likely to be less expensive than treatment.)176 Can voluntary programs
accomplish the same goals? (Compare the United States with the United
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, as suggested earlier.)Suppose that they do so
only a fraction as well? If we can only show "cause not shown" and not
''causation is excluded," can we rightly punish persons for refusing to (in their
view) risk autism or multiple sclerosis? Even if rare outcomes are assumed to be
vaccine caused, should we still be able to compel?
Where specially protected interests are concerned, questions of this sort
cannot be a matter of across-the-board judicial deference. This would be flatly
inconsistent with acknowledging a fundamental right or a liberty interest (or, in
175. The difficulties in specifying plausible operational meanings for standards of review are
vividly illustrated in a recent bout between the demands of First Amendment strict scrutiny and the
need to defer to expertise even within that realm. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130
S.Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010), upholding a statute banning "material support or resources" to foreign
terrorist organizations. One infers that strict scrutiny was used because the Court stated that the
intermediate standard in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), was insufficient; absent a
spectrum approach to standards of review, the next threshold up is strict scrutiny. 130 S.Ct. at 2723.
176. See, e.g., Peter A. Muennig & Kamran Khan, Cost-Effectiveness of Vaccination Versus
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other contexts, a suspect or semi-suspect classification). It is likely that the Court
will kick such questions to the legislative black box as often as it can it can, but
every quantum of deference raises the question about whether we are taking our
constitutional value rankings seriously.
4. Additional Moral Analytics, Some of Which Should be Absorbed Into
Constitutional Adjudication.
There are some additional moral issues to discuss here, and they raise in turn
the question of how courts are to address them within constitutional law. Would
it be sound constitutional jurisprudence for the Court, say, to address Judith
Jarvis Thompson's discussion of why a woman can dislodge the famous violinist
stuck to her (for nine months) so her kidneys could help his own to recover?1 771s
"independent judicial moral analysis" the only way to address this thought
experiment? For present purposes, however, I leave the issue aside and note only
a few points.
m Reinforcing a culture of coercion. I have suggested the need to analyze
any cluster of rights dealing with the integrity of the self, a phrase I use to refer to
the personal boundary problems of insulating body, mind, and identity from
unwanted intrusion. (It may also extend to their (re)construction and the
adjustment of their boundaries.) One analytic variable concerns the risk that any
form of government compulsion will reinforce a culture of coercion. Of course,
putting it this way risks a "this proves too much" response: all government is
morally unsound within this framework. The point can be cabined (to a degree)
by noting that the main risk occurs when we move beyond some standard,
ineradicable baseline-e.g., we are all subject to tax and traffic law enforcement,
even in a minimal state. Coercion by government (and in certain private
interpersonal situations) is often essential, but it ought, in a liberal society, to be
confined to furthering significant purposes. Vaccination does seem important in
this sense, but the example of large-scale voluntary vaccination irn places other
than the United States is impressive.178 So is the absence of physical force in
U.S. vaccination programs. Why is coercion through the threat of penal or civil
sanctions needed to achieve high vaccination compliance levels, and on what
standard of need? The spectacle of unneeded coercion reinforces authoritarian
behavior and our preferences for it. This is a human inclination that does not
need to be beefed up; we are already overly inured to it.
This focus on norm and behavior change is not only a relevant moral
approach (despite its gossamer nature), it also appears in judicial defenses of
fundamental rights, sometimes in fairly simple form.179 Consider these linked
177. See supra note 165and accompanying text
178. See,e.g., supra notel39.
179. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this case
[defamation of a public official] against the background of a profound national commitment to the
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claims:
The state already applies coercion to many of our daily activities.
Do we want to live in the sort of society that extends coercion to
routine immunization? At present, many industrialized countries
achieve high levels of immunization without the need for
compulsion. If such high levels can be maintained through
encouragement and incentives, this effectively achieves the aims
of the moderate communitarian, without the need for legislation.
Compulsory immunization would be certain to inflame those
who already believe that their Government interferes too much
with their freedom. What is more, coercion may alter perception
of risk. People who are coerced into an action may be more
likely to perceive the action as being risky than if they are
persuaded into it. Recent examples, albeit adult rather than child,
have been the mandatory immunization of military personnel
against anthrax and smallpox, which led to many protests and
loss of confidence. Most parents trust the assurances of health
care professionals that the benefits of immunizing their child
outweigh the risks. Making immunizations compulsory renders
trust redundant. If State coercion can be avoided in the area of
routine childhood immunization, so much the better. . . .[I]n
order to respect autonomy, State coercion should be kept to a
minimum. We believe that, in general, children should not be
compulsorily immunized when similar results can be achieved
by education and inducements. Australia is in the happy position
of having achieved very high rates of routine childhood
immunization, over 90%, without the need for compulsion.
Perhaps this is an occasion for what is now sometimes called "empirical
philosophy," which seems also to be a branch of psychology. How would we
test the risk that a given program of government coercion would adversely shift
felt moral values and resulting behavior? If there is such a risk, how does it
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."). The Court invalidated common law and statutory provisions allowing
defamation recoveries against public officials without a showing of malice. See also Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 592 (1983) (striking down a
tax that appeared to the Court to "single out" the press, thus "undercutting the basic assumption of
our political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government"). There
had been no showing of any legislative motives impermissible under the First Amendment. Id.
180. Isaacs et al., supra note 34, at 395; see also P. Bradley, Should Childhood Immunisation
Be Compulsory?, 25 J. MED. ETHICs 330 (1999) ("Compulsory vaccination cannot, with very few
exceptions, be justified in the UK, in view of the high levels of population immunity which
currently exist.").
18 1. See generally John Doris & Stephen Stich, Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches,
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compare with the risk that in the United States, voluntary vaccination programs
may not be adequate to the task of securing high compliance?l 82 Does requiring
parents to submit their children for vaccination erode our culture of familial
autonomy-a culture that is of constitutional status? Many vaccination
controversies concern the rights of parents to control the nurture and upbringing
of their children. 183
m The entanglement of individual rights assertion and community and
government interests. 184I said earlier (Section III.E.4) that that rights-assertion
stage and the government-societal interests stage flow into each other, but the
point now is somewhat different. The "ping pong" I referred to concerns the
continuing revaluation and possible recharacterization of something as an interest
or right, or as one bearing a certain strength. The idea here, however, is that (on
the one side) there are communitarian interests in preserving individual rights, as
well as in preventing disease, and that (on the other) individual assertions of right
are not asserted in a social vacuum: they are asserted against others, who have
their own rights and interests, and their very description implicates concerns that
may or may not be opposing.18 5
m Paternalism. There is no call to review the mounds of commentary on
paternalism generally and medical paternalism in particular. Claims of authority
(government or private) to override individual choice are often based, not on
harms likely to be inflicted on others, but solely on benefits to the person coerced
or influenced (often through preventing harm to her). It is sometimes hard to
disentangle such paternalism from coercion taken to avoid "externalities," but the
motivations are in theory distinct.186 Parallel difficulties are sometimes
encountered in vaccination policy. Compelling adults to be vaccinated, for
example, might be considered paternalistic because those who want to avoid
infection can simply arrange for their own vaccination. This is not a fully
182. See the discussion of the limits of persuasion in James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer,
Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public Health, and the Legacy of Jacobson v Massachusetts, 95 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 571, 573-74 (2005).
183. Bradley, supra note 180, at 331-32.
184. 1 do not mean to conflate society and government or their interests. However, in
constitutional adjudication, the government is generally the voice of the community, despite the
fact that individual rights claims may be communitarian claims of a sort within a liberal society.
See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
185. See generally John Tomasi, Individual Rights and Community Virtues, 101 ETHICS 521
(1991) ("Rights are conflict notions.").
186. Crash helmet laws illustrate the point. Those who oppose these laws usually ignore the
costs (monetary and otherwise) imposed on others who feel constrained by morality and social
norms to rescue them, or deny that these costs can rightly be viewed as significant harms to others
(especially if the cyclist is willing to die untreated). Cf Ruth Faden & Sirine Shebaya, Public
Health Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 12, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/
public health-ethics ("Defenders of compulsory motorcycle helmet laws, for example, argued that
the serious head injuries sustained by unprotected cyclists diverted emergency room personnel and
resources, thus harming other patients.").
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effective response because of incomplete vaccine effectiveness and uncertain
access to vaccination services, and because of the need to protect children, most
of whom cannot just hop in the car and go to the nearest vaccination site. In any
case, "this is patemalism" is not necessarily a decisive objection in all contexts,
even when understood to be confined to the competent and fully informed (or at
least to those who had a fair opportunity to be fully informed).
Antipatemalism is not an explicit theme in Professor Holland's Article, but it
surely is implicit in some of the accounts it refers to. No classical liberal is
entirely comfortable with paternalism, but it seems quite clear that sometimes
others do know better than you what is in your best interests, however competent
you are. Friends do not let friends do really stupid things. And we are not
supposed to let children run amok. (Protecting children is, etymologically, the
archetype of "paternalistic" action.)But here we are talking about government or
community paternalism, and even if government often is a force for good, it is
not generally your close personal friend. A practice of government patemalism
may easily do more harm than good, especially if there is a slippery slope nearby.
A plausible if not entirely convincing case of justifiable paternalistic
compulsion rests on a rough distinction between short and long run autonomy.
The imposition of coercion now, by avoiding future compromises of one's health
and thus impairments of one range of opportunities, thus helps assure greater
autonomy over a far more extended time. Compulsory vaccination is then
defended on this ground, possibly padded by reference to familiar human frailties
such as limited time horizons and "it can't happen to me" attitudes.
But whatever the merits of paternalistic approaches, we need to consider its
application to vaccination. Not all aspects of compulsory vaccination reflect
paternalistic reasons, but I do not try to untangle these strands here. I simply note
that some unvaccinated persons will come down with avoidable sickness, and
there will be costs not only to individual autonomy, but also to social interests. So
paternalism and protection of society are conceptually and empirically
intertwined.18 7
There is, however, a major benefit to antipaternalistic movements, even if
they go too far. They act as a check on excessive power by government and by
health care personnel. Constraints on government that might seem foolish in
particular instances might be justified as an institutionalized check on
government-particularly its expansion in areas of important rights. 189
187. One could maintain that they are intertwined even when each individual act contemplated
is purely paternalistic because the practice and the scale of paternalism affect the nature of society
and thus human interaction.
188. See, e.g., Matthew McCoy, Autonomy, Consent, and Medical Paternalism: Legal Issues
in Medical Intervention, 14 J. ALTERNATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MED. 785, 786 (2008) (stating that
there has been a shift from paternalism and that one effect has been the development of patient-
centered informed consent doctrine).
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The relevance of analysis of paternalism to constitutional argumentation is
clear enough, although the applicable doctrine may not be explicit. At the
Supreme Court level, at least in modem times, the idea that paternalism is
entirely illegitimate has not been vindicated. It does not work, as a constitutional
argument, to say that some weak forms of paternalism motivations cannot
properly underlie intrusions on specially protected rights.190As a matter of moral
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
190. On "weak" paternalism (e.g., short-term interference to promote longer term goals), see
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/
paternalism (last updated June 1, 2010). There seems no straightforward rejection of all claims to
all forms of paternalism as a legitimate interest under the rational basis test. Under heightened
scrutiny, the situation is more complex: certain forms of weak paternalism may be permissible
under such review, but strong paternalism is not a strong candidate for a compelling or important
interest, even if it is legitimate. For example, in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992), the Court ruled that "[b]efore viability, the State's interests are not strong enough
to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure." The principal state interest identified by the Court was
potential life-which clearly does not sound in paternalism: "On the other side of the equation is
the interest of the State in the protection of potential life." Id. at 871. But some measures to protect
the woman against her own decisions may be permissible as long as she retains the right to make
"the ultimate decision." Id. at 877. Thus: "In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a
woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences,
that her decision was not fully informed." Id. at 882. It remains, as Justice Holmes suggested in his
Lochner dissent, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not implement Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (invalidating a ban on price advertising of liquor, and stating that
"[s]uch speculation [on whether price advertising increases liquor consumption] certainly does not
suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends"). The
standard of review was "the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech
cases." Id. at 507. Rigorous constitutional scrutiny does seem to embrace the antipaternalistic
"shibboleth" Justice Holmes complained about in Lochner. But it is not excluded as a legitimate
interest under minimal scrutiny, and some weak forms seem permissible under heightened review,
as Casey indicates. In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), a
case upholding a limitation on the fee that veterans may pay to attorneys or agents representing
them in trying to obtain certain benefits from the Veterans' Administration, the Court stated the
following:
It is not for the District Court or any other federal court to invalidate a federal
statute by so cavalierly dismissing a long-asserted congressional purpose. If
"paternalism" is an insignificant Government interest, then Congress first went
astray in 1792, when by its Act of March 23 of that year it prohibited the "sale,
transfer or mortgage . . . of the pension . . . [of a] soldier . . . before the same
shall become due." Acts of Congress long on the books, such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act, might similarly be described as "paternalistic" ... [Lochner's]
day is fortunately long gone, and with it the condemnation of rational
paternalism as a legitimate legislative goal.
Id. at 323 (first four alterations in original) (citation omitted). This was not a heightened scrutiny
case. Justice Stevens dissented (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented, arguing that
the Court had undervalued individual liberty and (operationally) implementing more rigorous
scrutiny than did the Court, and criticizing the paternalistic justification as-in this case-
irrational. Id. at 367.
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analysis, one might conclude differently.
V. ADDITIONAL CRITICISMS.
A. Conflicts ofInterest: the Vaccine Manufacturers (and Others) Want to
Make Money.
I say people are no damn good. Human motivation is not always to do right
by others, or (perhaps) even oneself. Some may even think it wrong to try to do
right by others. I do not name names. But if we say all human action labors under
a conflict of interest then we fail to mark out those special conflicts warranting
legal (or other special) attention. Removing a judge or disbarring a lawyer on
conflict-of-interest grounds requires more than claiming that they were (say)
simply trying to advance their careers even when rendering the soundest
decisions. Every judge is under an incentive to write praiseworthy opinions for
personal advancement, not solely to serve society. There is a baseline of
individual "aggrandizement" that is largely ineradicable and does not count as
legally indictable, though it poses ongoing moral risks.
So, we should, of course, be skeptical about most vendor claims of
perfection and safety. But how does this skepticism play out operationally?
Physicians want business. They want you to consult them-we still have direct
fee for service transactions, which reinforces this incentive. And if patients avoid
Dr. K. at the local HMO, where there may be no direct pay for service, they
might not last long there. Patients have to keep coming, so physicians will say
what they need to say to keep and gain customers. Therefore, do not believe
anything physicians say, right? As for pharmaceutical companies-do not take
any analgesics, even over the counter: their developers and sellers just want to
make money, whatever the risks to you.
Of course, this is hyper-hyperbolic. The Article was far from simply
dismissing vaccines as lethal and ineffective. Their value and safety, however,
are called into question, less pointedly, but nonetheless clearly. Professor
Holland, for example, speaks of the "culture of conflicts of interest" and
discusses at some length the "Financial Distortions in the Hepatitis B Mandates."
She states, "The vaccination of four million infants per year yields a substantial
annual income stream in the hundreds of millions of dollars," and she lists among
the distorting factors "advisers' financial ties to vaccine manufacturers."'191
Although I would not align vaccine manufacturers with those offering to sell
the Brooklyn Bridge, the skeptical stance about vaccine quality is well taken as a
part of a rational process of evaluating vaccination programs. This is no small
task, since most of us cannot run biomedical research projects and there is a
problem of evaluating qualified evaluators: they too would like to earn a good
160
191. Holland, supra note 5, at 77.
XII: 1 (2012)
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living. Nor is the conflict of interest problem confined to decentralized economic
systems. But we are not about to dismantle capitalism, its markets, and
government, so there will always be a basis for skepticism about many claims by
many contracting parties. What do we do as consumers, then? We try to reduce
any incremental, over-the-baseline risks to the public interest arising from
incentives for individual or institutional aggrandizement, and we try to do it
without unduly impairing the productive enterprise. It is pretty hard to do both,
and the risks are largely non-eliminable. The list of standard public-protective
measures is not that hard to formulate, but most of them bear internal tensions.
We can say that vaccine evaluators should have minimal ties, if any, to vaccine
manufacturers and distributors; but such evaluators were not trained in a vacuum:
any competent researcher will know others in the field, and many of the best
work for or with Pharma. Disallowing ties means losing able consultants, some
of whom may in fact be sufficiently objective to render a reliable judgment,
regardless of appearances.
How do we implant conflict of interest considerations into vaccine policy
and constitutional analysis? The Article is not entirely clear on this. It does not
call for shutting anything down. But, if we do not do so, how do we reduce risks
and exercise due care? And what do we do about the hepatitis B vaccine in this
light? If we cannot rely on need, efficacy, and safety claims, because of
commercial (or other) incentives to lie, withhold, or distort information, why
should we even permit voluntary vaccination?
The constitutional analysis is fairly straightforward, if imprecise. Conflicts
of interest within the vaccination and other healthcare establishments pose risks
to persons who are being compelled to accept treatment. If safety and efficacy
conclusions are tainted by improper motivations and techniques, government
justifications for coercion are correspondingly weakened or fail altogether. This
is an analytic line one would expect (and sometimes demand) under heightened
scrutiny. The parallel to Justice Brennan's attack on Oklahoma's methodology in
Craig is clear. He raised the possibility of skewed motivations of the police in
arresting more males than females: "[R]eckless young men who drink and drive
are transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are
chivalrously escorted home.,,192 This did not establish that Oklahoma's
conclusions were false and that the gender classification had no adequate
foundation, but the asserted methodological flaws were taken to foreclose the
government from confidently drawing its inferences about differential risks.
Those inferences were not thought, in Craig, to warrant strong deference, if any.
The surveys, as presented to the Court, did not, in Justice Brennan's view,
facially exclude nontrivial risks of impaired methodology. Whether Justice
Brennan's analysis was done well is arguable, but I think he was constitutionally
obliged to pursue this general line of inquiry into the methodologies for gathering
192. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 203 n.14(1976).
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data and drawing inferences from them, given the elevated status of the
individual constitutional interest involved.
Still, skewed and conflicted motivations are intrinsic problems in every
study and every marketing effort. This is why clinical trials generally require
(where practicable) double-blind studies, and why pharmaceutical salespersons
are not always taken at their word. And, this is why we are always at risk,
whether we take a dose of ibuprofen or hepatitis B vaccine. Although they are
obviously not the only source of risk, "baseline" conflicts of interest are inherent
in human action and cannot be shut down. There is, then, no reason for automatic
deference to the label or the package insert or to a physician's claim.
Nevertheless, in pursuing heightened scrutiny of empirical claims that
inform risk assessment, courts should inquire into the presence of serious,
ameliorable risks that exist atop the baseline incidence of mixed incentives that
may compromise the public interest. When operating within such scrutiny, total
reliance on legislative and administrative findings and inferences is
inappropriate. 193 "The primary problem with legal conflict-of-interest doctrine is
that it fails to recognize conflict of interest as a type of risk analysis aimed at
setting acceptable risk levels regarding perverse incentives."1 94The point is as
applicable in vaccinology as it is in regulation of the legal profession.
B.Impaired Informed Consent Processes
Professor Holland's central point here is that legislative and administrative
law and practice has impaired the informed consent process in the administration
of vaccines. If this process is compromised, then the government compulsion
system is not effectively narrowed to reduce the costs to the assumed liberty
interest at stake. Securing informed consent is at the core of protecting the
integrity of the self, which is in turn the substance of the liberty interest.
Few claim that lack of perfect information means forecloses informed
consent. Nor does confusion about one's preferences or the moral requirements
of caring for oneself, one's family, and others render informed consent
impossible. The few who say otherwise are using the concept of informed
consent unsoundly. Such excess does not appear in the Article. But, the claim
that informed consent-and, thus, autonomy and constitutional liberty-have
been unduly burdened in the vaccine area is not clearly shown. The author
argues:
193. Cf Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 176, 130 S. Ct. at 2727-28
(addressing the tension between heightened scrutiny and deference to government findings).
194. Kevin C. McMunigal, Conflict of Interest as Risk Analysis, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
THE PROFESSIONs 61, 62 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001) (emphasis added); see
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The norm of informed consent in medicine requires doctors to
provide extensive information about the known risks of
interventions to patients and to allow the patients to make the
ultimate decisions. Similarly, drug manufacturers are required by
law to provide accurate and complete information about drug
risks with their products. In vaccination law, however, these
norms are substantially relaxed. The NCVIA does not require
doctors or vaccine manufacturers to give complete warnings
directly to the person or guardian of the child being vaccinated.
It requires that doctors give government-produced information
and requires that manufacturers provide proper warnings to
doctors only, who are considered to be "learned intermediaries."
Both industry and the medical community lobbied for this
lowered standard.195
A legally imposed impairment of informed consent surely threatens our
posited constitutional liberty interest in resisting vaccination. A law forbidding
transmission of significant efficacy and safety information to prospective
vaccinees would be unconstitutional under any version of heightened scrutiny,
and possibly even under the rational basis test.196 What about a law forbidding
disclosures about claimed adverse events because they would be prejudicial and
result in some persons losing needed vaccination protection? Same result.
Suppose there was a law requiring that all adverse event reports be made
available to vaccinees. Such a law would probably not be unconstitutional
because of the marginal relevance of the undifferentiated mass of such reports.
But, the Article's claim that informed consent requirements have been
seriously compromised by the law seems overstated. What does "complete"
("complete warnings" are not required) mean? No legal regime of informed
consent requires disclosure of every conceivable risk. And, exactly why is the
manufacturer required to directly inform the vaccinee? Could this be via package
insert? Or manufacturers' representatives at the vaccination site? Does the law
displace existing state doctrine concerning physicians' duties to disclose? Neither
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 nor the Court's opinion
applying portions of it in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth seem to preempt state-imposed
duties (whatever they are) on physicians; they only address the matter of design
defects and duties to warn by manufacturers.
195. Holland at 79.
196. Some may think otherwise in special settings, e.g. the military or health professions. See,
e.g., George J. Annas, Opinion: Don't Force Medical Pros to Get HINI Vaccine, NEWSDAY, Oct.
3, 2009, http://www.newsday.com/opinion/opinion-don-t-force-medical-pros-to-get-h Inl -vaccine-
1.1496620.
197. Holland states (id at 59) (my remarks are in bracketed italics): "Complementing
manufacturers' relief from disclosure requirements [As argued, this seems quite overstated] another
provision exempts doctors from substantial federal disclosure requirements. [Not clear what this
means.]It tasks the HHS Secretary to 'develop and disseminate vaccine information materials.' It
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The federal law probably should have been more explicit, as the author
suggests, but I do not think the Article shows that informed consent and therefore
a constitutional liberty interest in personal security is compromised under the
1986 law. It is not clear exactly what the author wants done by manufacturers or
physicians, although she refers to proposed state legislation requiring physicians
to provide the package insert.
C. Unrepresentative Decision-making
This framework of criticism of vaccine policy is closely related to the
concerns about conflicts of interest. Professor Holland states:
Part of Jacobson's rationale for deference to state legislatures
was their representative nature; legislatures by their nature must
take account of differing views in the population. If the
legislature makes bad choices, the electorate can reverse those
choices and unseat the legislators through popular elections. But
ACIP [Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices] 98 has
become the driving force behind vaccination mandates, a federal
advisory body with almost no public participation and no direct
accountability to voters. Because of this change in the locus of
true decision-making from legislators to ACIP, there are far
greater risks of conflicts of interest. ACIP advisors have strong
ties to industry, and financial and professional self-interest may
outweigh public health in their decision-making.199
I do not know what theory of democratic representation is presupposed here.
It seems to be assumed that if someone is not simply part of the lay citizenry, she
states that these materials should outline the benefits and risks of vaccines and the availability of
the VICP. Doctors are obliged to provide families with these information materials." I don't fully
follow this. From which disclosure requirements are physicians exempted? If the idea is that the
federal provisions preempt basic aspects of state informed consent laws, the point needs to be
argued more clearly. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011), doesn't seem to address this. It
held that National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempted design-defect actions brought against
vaccine manufacturers. The Court noted: "Manufacturers are generally immunized from liability
for failure to warn if they have complied with all regulatory requirements (including but not limited
to warning requirements) and have given the warning either to the claimant or the claimant's
physician." Id at 1074. True, this portion of the Act doesn't refer precisely to physicians, but it
doesn't purport to relieve them of any liability either. The Act provides: "Except as provided in
subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section State law shall apply to a civil action brought for
damages for a vaccine-related injury or death." 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(a)(West 2011). There is an
expressly labeled preemption section: "No State may establish or enforce a law which prohibits an
individual from bringing a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer for damages for a vaccine-
related injury or death if such civil action is not barred by this part." Id. §300aa-22(e).
198. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 217a (West 2011), concerning the creation of advisory councils and
committees for the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
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cannot "represent" it, despite the fact that members of government advisory
committees are expected to act for the public interest, and not just some distinct
constituency.200 But, depending on their function, they can be aligned with
particular groups. Indeed, why else would government seek to appoint members
of particular groups in its quest for "representative" bodies? Members of
government agencies and advisory groups are understood to be linked to a variety
of frameworks, while at the same time operating under a public interest ideal. If
this seems paradoxical, so do democracy and the very idea of objectivity. I do not
think that Professor Holland would deny any of this, but, given her critique, one
needs to recall that the duty to promote the public interest does not lie in having
no definable perspective, but in being able to enter in some way into the
perspective of others. As Thomas Nagel put it, "As in metaphysics, so in the
realm of practical reason the truth is sometimes best understood from a detached
standpoint; but sometimes it will be fully comprehensible only from a particular
perspective within the world." 201
It is thus not inconsistent with either democracy or the pursuit of sound
public policy for persons exercising certain forms of government power to
represent particular constituencies; it depends on the nature of the enterprise and
what "representation" means in a given context. It is neither possible nor
desirable for people to escape or elude all frameworks of interest, include some
frameworks that are in tension with others. We do not and cannot function
outside all value frameworks. To try to wrench ourselves from this reality would
202impair the public interest.
To be sure, political representation, even if meant to provide a voice to
certain interests, is supposed to be exercised with a degree of objectivity that
avoids blind fanaticism. Certainly, not everyone can be trusted to work with
appropriate objectivity or detachment all the time, but it seems unreasonable to
impose, across the board, either some sort of proportional representation
requirement (which presupposes interest representation) or a populist template
200. Although the law setting up the National Vaccine Advisory Committee doesn't use the
term "public interest," the mandate of the Committee is inconsistent with simple representation of
discrete partisan interests. See National Vaccine Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-5 (West 2011). The
Administrative Procedure Act is strewn with references to promoting the public interest. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 551 (West 2011). In any case, as I argue in the text, an administrative committee member who
acts (at least not blindly or reflexively) for a particular constituency or interest is not necessarily
opposed to the public interest. In fact it is undemocratic and may damage the public interest
systematically to prevent specialized or partisan representation across the board, in all forms.
Context is critical.
201. Cf THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 140 (1986). Nagel also urges that "the
detachment that objectivity requires is bound to leave something behind." Id. at 87.
202. Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.
stanford.edu/enties/political-representation/#DelVsTru (last updated Oct. 17, 201 1)(discussing,
among other things, "interest-group pluralism, which [Melissa] Williams describes as the 'theory of
the organization of shared social interests with the purpose of securing the equitable representation
... of those groups in public policies').
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(undifferentiated peoplehood, no "elites") 203 onto all administrative advisory
committees. In any case, "public members" are likely to have crystallized views
on one side or another of many programs, whether concerning vaccine policy or
sewer construction. Some administrators "representing the public" will be
partisans or activists for some distinct position: there is no univocal mass public
viewpoint.
Of course, I do not all claim that, for administrative representation, "It's all
good."I concur with many seriously misanthropic views and assume that many
agencies are often embarked on mischief. But much more is required than is
shown in the Article before any case is made out that vaccine policy is so
"distorted" that it needs to be upended in order to save it (if it is to be saved at
all). Indeed, it is hard to state what the baseline for nondistortion might be.
Members of the ACIP will, in the aggregate, hold many preexisting and
competing points of view, and this does not automatically make that body
"unrepresentative" or render their respective interests "conflicted," or keep them
from trying in good faith to promote the public interest.
A particular complaint about unrepresentativeness is (quoting Belkin) that
"the interests of newborn babies were not represented on the original panel that
created this vaccination policy in 1991."204 But the bare objection that newborns
(and perhaps those unconceived when the vaccination policy was adopted) are
not "represented" is a nonstarter in almost every argument.205 What would it
mean to "represent" them? Who could do so? Persons trained to imagine
themselves in "the original position" behind "the veil of ignorance" made famous
by John Rawls?206 People who expect to be newborns once again? Whether one
should be attentive to the interests of future persons, whatever their
designation-contingent, certain, possible, potential-is one thing, but vaccine
policy does not demonstrate a representational failure for failing to do the
impossible. (True, someone can simply be designated as an official
"representative" for the unconceived, but it is hard to see how this renders him or
her a true representative in any plausible sense.)
Perhaps the argument from nonrepresentativeness is meant as the beginning
of a critique of modern American administrative law generally, or at least in the
health care area. If so, much more is required to make out a case.
203. Cf Margaret Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, 47
POL. STUDIES 2, 3 (1999) (explaining it as "an appeal to the 'people"').
204. Holland at 76.
205. Compare this to the issue of obligations to future or possible persons. See generally
DAVID HEYD, GENETHICS: MORAL ISSUES IN THE CREATION OF PEOPLE 13, 24 (1992).
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D. Communicable Versus Noncommunicable Disorders; Self-Protection Against
the Unvaccinated
The prime target of vaccination policy is communicable disease (e.g.,
smallpox). But if one is really worried about getting such a disease, one need
only get a vaccination, right? So, protect yourself; you do not need to try to
compel others to do things that threaten you when you can easily blunt the threat.
Moreover, for those disorders often caused by avoidable behaviors-drug use,
sex-one can seriously reduce or eliminate the risk by in fact not pursuing the
dangerous conduct.
If all this is so, what could justify the invasion of the liberty interest-even if
the liberty interest were not that valuable? If coercion is either useless or
unnecessary given the possibility of behavior change, invasions of even minor
liberty interests are not justified.
Moreover, some diseases with corresponding vaccines are not
communicable or contagious.207 One rationale for compelled vaccination against
such noncommunicable diseases is the protection of pregnant women whose
children may become infected, as noted by Professor Holland. 208 But the simplest
justification is just that it secures children against a genuine risk of physical harm
and of interference with their education. This justification withstands a
paternalism objection where children are concerned, although the parental
autonomy objection has not withered away. For adults, however, the argument
would be that, with no parents egging them on, they would simply dela , even
though their rational selves would know that this is unduly risky. 9 This
weakness-of-will framework is a standard criterion in efforts to justify forms of
weak paternalism. 210
207. At least one source suggests that contagious diseases are simply highly communicable
diseases. Communicable diseases are infectious diseases that can be transmitted from one person to
another. Infectious diseases are those caused by microorganisms. Controlling the Spread of
Contagious Diseases: Quarantine and Isolation, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.org/
preparedness/cdcenglish/IsoQuar.asp (last updated Feb. 23, 2006).
208. See Holland, supra note 5, at 51.
209. See generally Horlick et al., supra note 139, at S80("Laws are also used to require
vaccinations against diseases for which herd immunity and free-riding do not play a role ([e.g.],
tetanus, because there is no human-to-human transmission). The principal justification for a law in
this setting is not to build herd immunity or prevent free-riding but simply to protect the child
against an infection. Also, an argument can be made that these non-herd-immunity vaccines
prevent harm to others by reducing the burden of health care costs caused by the diseases
prevented. However, the principal rationale for the laws is simply the determination by society that
the beneficence (avoidance of disease in the individual vaccine recipient) represented by a legal
requirement outweighs the infringement on individual autonomy. Society has made the same
determination for many other public health interventions, including, for example, motorcycle and
bicycle helmet laws.").
210. Cf Danny Scoccia, In Defense of Hard Paternalism, 27 L. & PHIL. 351 (2008); Gerald
Dworkin, Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/paternalism
(last updated June 1, 2010)(explaining that a weak paternalist holds it permissible to interfere with
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The argument based on voluntary self-protection against communicable
diseases implicates some connected points. Although it varies with age, children
are generally far less capable of securing healthcare on their own than are adults.
Moreover-a point that comprehends both adults and children-vaccination is
not one hundred percent effective, so that one's risks of infection go up when the
proportion of vaccinees in the population goes down. The greater the herd
immunity, the safer one is.
Still, those who do not get vaccinated at all-saving some money and
time-are free riding, relying on the immunity of others, and this is (as with most
free-riding) often unfair, inegalitarian, and disutilitarian.211 This framework for
judgment is not much addressed in the Article. To be sure, free riding may seem
more or less rational from the individual's perspective.
Finally, the avoidance of behaviors generally disdained-drug use and
certain forms of risky sex-remains, at least in the background, as a reason for
attacking the compulsory means chosen to further government interests.212 But
not all cases of hepatitis B come directly from such behaviors.
CONCLUSION
Professor Holland's Article provides an occasion for considering how far we
should push our notion of rights within American traditions, constitutional and
otherwise. True, many things provide such an occasion, but this is the only one
that I have been asked to respond to on this occasion.
If Professor Holland wanted to add to the skeptical view of vaccination
generally and hepatitis B vaccination in particular, then she has made a
contribution. Responding to her arguments requires probing the complex ideas of
integrity of body, mind, and identity, their place in constitutional and moral
theory, and determining what government must show in order to override claims
of right. And she has provided some indication that all is not what we would like
it to be in the field of vaccinology and its practice. But her analysis is
questionable in certain respects. Here are some points to consider. They reflect
choice of means that may defeat one's goals).
211. In some regions, vaccinations are free of charge. See Horlick, supra note 139, at S81
(referring to the United Kingdom).
212. See Horlick, supra note 139, at S80 ("Some parents may see school-entry laws as
displacing their traditional authority to decide what medical treatments their children should
receive. These parents assert that they are in a better position to judge the medical needs of their
children than the state. The hepatitis B vaccine is a case in point. Since the enactment of hepatitis B
vaccine school-entry laws in the early 1990s, concerns have been raised that vaccination mandates
are not justified if they are meant to prevent diseases that can be avoided primarily by behavior,
such as abstinence from illegal drug use and certain sexual behaviors. The HPV vaccine may be
considered by some to fall in the category of diseases that may be avoided by behavior. Concerns
have also been raised that vaccination against sexually transmitted diseases in adolescents can
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two dimensions of my response: a critique of her arguments as they were
presented, and a description of frameworks and arguments that might have been
invoked to further her analysis.
The nature of the right against vaccination, and the larger set of rights in
which it resides, is not sufficiently made out. Sometimes it seems as if the
analysis of risks is the only thing that counts; sometimes it seems as if personal
preference, exercised as purely autonomous action, is the only thing that counts.
Most of us want to do the right thing, but we do not want to be made to do it,
even if the invasion of our interests seems minor from a detached perspective.
But it is often right-even obligatory-for the community to make us do things
over our objections.
The value premises that inform and drive the Article are not clear. These
premises concern autonomy and personal integrity, the nature of harms to these
interests and to individual and aggregate health, and the terms in which we
consider when it is worth it to inflict or allow certain kinds of harm on some
persons in order to benefit them and others. We need more transparency for the
process of determining whether and when we should run the risks imposed by x
thousand vaccinations in order to save the lives or protect against serious health
threats of "only" n persons. Once again, how do we get to the conclusion that this
is an "only," not worth the harms and injuries to personal integrity?
The operational meaning of standards of review-how they are applied and
why-need greater specification, justification, and elaboration. This is necessary
because the very logic of those standards implement our constitutional
hierarchies. Because of this, I suggested ways of understanding their nature,
structure, and use, and in particular the operational upshot of applying them in
given cases.
The argument based on vaccination risk is not made out in the Article. Very
few causal links between hepatitis B vaccination and adverse events are
established. The Article does not sufficiently acknowledge the difficulties-far
beyond recording adverse effects-in establishing causation. Even if causality of
rare occurrences is conceded, the argument against compulsion is not made out.
Nevertheless, in order to further the analysis, I observed that one can raise rights
claims even where causation of harm is not scientifically made out, and
suggested some arguments in defense of doing so (though I do not find them
persuasive).
The Article's constitutional analysis suffers from a hyperextension of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts and from various technical problems in articulating
prior, existing, and projected doctrine. Jacobson is not sufficiently "translated"
into contemporary doctrine. To that end, I offered an additional parsing of
Jacobson and analyzed a hypothetical Jacobson 2.1.
The constitutional analysis is also burdened by an incomplete analysis of
decision-making supposedly compromised by conflicts of interest and inadequate
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public representation. Here, I tried to make the nature of the gaps in the Article
more precise, but without offering any theories of representation or conflict of
interest.
Still, the Article did enough to make us pause before automatically following
our physicians' advice to vaccinate. Rarely, one suffers much more than a fever
or redness or a sore behind, and most of the time we do not know why
(anaphylaxis excepted), although in most cases research and theory strongly
suggest no link between vaccination and serious adversities occurring within its
res gestae. Vaccination advice comes from sources that may be burdened by
more than everyday conflicted motivations, thus risking decisions that might
work against the interest of some persons and against the public's interest
generally. Perhaps the rational thing to do is to keep getting vaccinated (in most
cases) and to keep complaining about it (in some cases)-a bit of a clumsy
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